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ONE SIZE DOES NOT FIT ALL: A CONTEXTUAL APPROACH
TO FIDUCIARY DUTIES OWED TO PREFERRED
STOCKHOLDERS FROM VENTURE CAPITAL TO PUBLIC
PREFERRED TO FAMILY BUSINESS

Juliet P. Kostritsky*
ABSTRACT

This Article examines whether corporations should owe
fiduciary duties to their preferred stockholders as preferred
stockholders across all settings of preferred stock holding. In
one context, sophisticated venture capitalists ("VCs") purchase
preferred stock after carefully negotiating the stock price,
control over the corporate governance, and other key
stipulations by contract. Additionally, because the initial
preferred stockholder could protect its interests through staged
financing or board control, the preferred stockholder might not
discount the stock even if it lacked protection, since the other
protective devices made the lack of such protections
inconsequential, so the initial holders will not pay for these
added fiduciary protections. In such settings it does not make
sense for the corporationto owe fiduciary duties to the preferred
stockholders as preferred. In fact, doing so rearrangesthe basis
on which the initial stockholders purchased the stock, and
implying a fiduciary term constitutes a hit to the common
stockholders and thus ignores the terms of the claimants and
the risk and targeted return for each of them. However, while it
makes sense for sophisticated venture capitaliststo rely only on
bargained-forcontractualprotections, this Article identifies two
specific contexts where a limited fiduciary obligation should be
* Everett D. and Eugenia S. McCurdy Professor of Contract Law. This Article is
dedicated to Professors Ronald J. Coffey and David P. Porter without whom this Article
could not have been written. Professors Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., and Charles R. Korsmo
provided valuable insights. Kathleen Harvey (C.W.R.U. J.D. 2016) and Daniel Wolfe
(C.W.R.U. J.D. 2018) provided superb research assistance. Robert Myers is a librarian
expert at sleuthing every source imaginable. Errors remain mine alone.
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extended to preferred stockholders who lack bargainingpower.
The first is when non-working children are given preferred
stock in a family business. The second is when a corporation
takes on a new, unfamiliar product line, allowing common
stockholders to wipe out the value of publicly traded preferred
stock. When the preferred stock is purchased in the public
marketplace, the preferred stockholders will not have any
bargaining power in the preferred stock's contractual
arrangement. Moreover, the additional terms routine in
shareholder agreements between VCs and founders are almost
never found in the charter documents, so those provisions will
not be transferable. To the subsequent purchaser of preferred
stock, the lack of such protections might call for a limited
fiduciary duty if the markets for preferred stock are not as
efficient as for common stock or if there are chinks in the
efficient capital market hypothesis. Where the disciplining
effects of the market are weaker, subsequent buyers of the
preferred stock may not price the stock accurately to reflect the
lack of transferable protections, providing a justification for a
limited fiduciary duty in that context if implying the term
would add value.
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INTRODUCTION

When conflicts between preferred and common stockholders arise,
the key inquiry is whether the preferred stockholders must depend
exclusively on the contractual protections that they have negotiated' or
whether they should be protected by a fiduciary duty that goes beyond
the fiduciary duty owed to all equity holders. 2
Of course, in the ordinary course when the company is making
money, the terms of the preferred stockholder will be honored. 3 Absent
a steady-state norm of paying preferred stockholders across a wide
section of companies, there would no market for preferred stock and
those preferring less risk than that offered by common stock would
invest in debt rather than preferred stock. Conflicts between preferred
and common stockholders only arise in the aberrant case where the
company is declining in value and does not have enough money to
satisfy obligations to the preferred and the common.
In these aberrant cases, Delaware courts have resolved that
preferred stockholders must depend exclusively on those contractual
protections and cannot rely on courts to imply fiduciary obligations in
their favor.4 There is one exception: when the preferred are not

,

1. The bundle of contractual rights, privileges, and limitations are contained in the
Stock Purchase Agreement; the agreement comprises additional covenants not found in
the express shares.
2. Some commentators see the dual roots of the preferred in both corporate law and
in contract cause the law to "vacillate[]." See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, A
Theory of Preferred Stock, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1815, 1820 (2013). However, this Article
differs from that and finds that the results largely make sense and are consistent with a
cost-minimizing, wealth-maximizing approach to firm value.
3. As Bratton and Wachter explain, "In this case [upside], the venture impresses the
market and proceeds to an initial public offering (IPO). .. . The venture capitalist's
counterparty, the 'entrepreneur,' shares the jackpot and resumes control of the company
.... Id. at 1875 (footnotes omitted).
4. See, e.g., Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A.2d 584, 600 (Del. Ch. 1986).
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invoking their preferential, contractual rights, the preferred "are
entitled to the same fiduciary duties as common shareholders." 5
This contractual approach to preferred stockholders has provoked
varied reactions among commentators. Some allege that the preferred
are vulnerable and oppressed and require additional fiduciary
protections.6 Others embrace the categorical approach denying all
fiduciary protection to the preferred regardless of whether the preferred
or common control the board of directors.7
This Article argues that instead of using one approach for all cases
involving preferred stockholders, either protecting all preferred
stockholders or denying protection to all preferred stockholders who are
not protected by contract, courts should instead differentiate and
modulate the rule depending on the circumstances in which the
preferred stock is issued. This Article argues that there can be no one
size fits all solution to the fiduciary duty issue for the preferred
stockholder.8
In some settings of venture capital where the preferred can easily
arrange their transactions to avoid adverse outcomes either through
contract, staged financing, discounted market pricing, or other
protective strategies, a single analysis should be used to determine
whether to imply a fiduciary duty or some other term in an exchange
transaction.9 A legal adjudicator should only imply fiduciary protection

5. Melissa M. McEllin, Note, Rethinking Jedwab: A Revised Approach to Preferred
ShareholderRights, 2010 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 895, 898; see also Gradient OC Master,
Ltd. v. NBC Universal, Inc., 930 A.2d 104, 116-17 (Del. Ch. 2007); 11 WILLIAM MEADE
FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS

§

5295

(perm. ed., rev. vol. 2010) (suggesting an equitable approach to rights preferred share
with common stockholders). But see STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAw 255 (3rd
ed. 2015) ("Delaware supreme court precedents ...
suggest that all of the rights of
preferred stockholders are contractual . . . not just those relating to preferential rights
6. Lawrence Mitchell would do so "incorporating a fairness notion into directors'
decision-making" to "provide preferred shareholders with meaningful fiduciary rights."
McEllin, supra note 5, at 923; see also Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Puzzling Paradox of
Preferred Stock (and Why We Should Care About It), 51 Bus. LAw. 443, 449, 473-74
(1996).
7. Charles R. Korsmo, Venture Capital and Preferred Stock, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 1163,
1166 (2013).
8. The law itself does not differentiate between different types of preferred
stockholders.
9. The same analysis should govern whether courts add terms in other settings, such
as adding implied terms in the contractual setting. For an application of the analysis
developed in this Article in contract, see Juliet P. Kostritsky, Taxonomy for Justifying
Legal Intervention in an Imperfect World: What to Do When Parties Have Not Achieved
Bargainsor Have DraftedIncomplete Contracts, 2004 WIS. L. REv. 323, 325 (2004).
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if doing so will minimize total costs10 and maximize the "long-run value
of the firm."11 In determining whether the ultimacy of increased gains
from trade at the lowest cost will be achieved by a particular legal
intervention, the adjudicator must confront assumptions about reality, 12
address the use of private strategies that may be more cost effective
than legal intervention, 13 consider the reform effects on future parties
subject to the legal intervention, and calculate the offsetting costs of
legal intervention.14
One cost from supplying a fiduciary obligation to the preferred and
implying additional protections after the fact is that there would be an
immediate hit to the other claimant, the common stockholder, since the
agent, the board, now owes an additional obligation to the preferred not
bargained for.16 Another cost-and thus another potential downside to
an implied fiduciary protection for the preferred-is that doing so
increases uncertainty, and can thus destabilize voluntary arrangements
and delicately balanced systems of incentives that the court does not
understand.' 6 Since the claimants made their investments based on
certain risks, and the price of the stock reflected those risks, including
the lack of implied fiduciary protections except those shared with the
10. This analysis of judicial intervention therefore begins with the nature, function,
and dynamics of exchange, and the ultimacy to be achieved by exchange. Cost
minimization objectives in exchange transactions explain why parties adopt the
arrangements they do. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF
CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 17 (1985). In some instances,

the costs savings from adding a term may be less than other types of costs that would be
generated by the addition so the added term would not be efficient.
11. See Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the
Corporate Objective Function, 12 Bus. ETHICS Q. 235, 235 (2002) (endorsing this objective
as the appropriate framework for corporate decision-making). A similar analysis is used to
determine whether to imply default rules in contractual contexts. See Kostritsky, supra
note 9, at 329 ("Courts should decide whether legal intervention will increase gains from
trade by projecting what consequences, both ex ante and ex post, legal intervention will
produce.").
12. Assumptions about reality include fundamental characteristics such as bounded
rationality and opportunism as the likely incentive effects of certain legal rules. See
WILLIAMSON, supranote 10, at 43-52 (discussing the traits of the "contractual man").
13. Stewart Macaulay did pioneering work on contexts in which "legal sanctions are
often unnecessary and may have undesirable consequences." Stewart Macaulay, NonContractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55 (1963),
reprinted in REVISITING THE CONTRACTS SCHOLARSHIP OF STEWART MACAULAY: ON THE
EMPIRICAL AND THE LYRICAL 1, 1 (Jean Braucher et al. eds., 2013). Macaulay explored
why "[i]n most situations contract is not needed" since parties resort to other ways to
solve problems. Id. at 12.
14. If offsetting costs outweigh the benefits, it would be perverse to intervene. See id.
at 1.
15. Korsmo, supra note 7, at 1163-66.
16. Id. at 1167.
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common,17 adding such protections after the fact would alter the
essential terms of the deal and would not be cost minimizing as a legal
strategy. Thus, even if one accepts that venture capital contracts are
incompletels since "preferred stock certificates are by nature short and
incomplete,"o there is no reason that preferred stockholders in venture
capital contexts have omitted anything that was important to them. If
there are omissions, they have priced their shares to reflect the lack of
specific contractual provisions, perhaps through a higher dividend. In
either case, adding protections in such contexts would not be value
maximizing. This is particularly true in the context of venture capital
preferred stock or other sophisticated investor contexts because once an
adverse decision to the preferred is rendered, a protective provision will
become universal in the industry. 20
Moreover, if the investments of the preferred and common stock
claimants are viewed through a principal-agent lens, then all
stockholders take the risk that the agent, who represents dual classes of
stock and is tasked with maximizing the value of the firm, might take
actions from time to time that hurt one claimant and help another
claimant so long as the action was "value-neutral" or more than "valueneutral for the firm." 2 1 To the extent that such shifts in wealth are
anticipated, protections can be implemented by the preferred, once
again suggesting that law-supplied terms for such preferred
stockholders would not maximize wealth.
However, the ability of the preferred to protect themselves by
contract or other private strategies will vary widely. This suggests that
a different legal approach that does not uniformly relegate preferred to
the contractual protections might be appropriate.
17. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 2, at 1819-20.
18. See id. at 1857 (noting that incompleteness of preferred stockholders' contracts
renders them vulnerable to board opportunism).
19. McEllin, supra note 5, at 910.
20. Interview with David P. Porter, M&A Lawyer & Visiting Professor at Case W.
Reserve Univ. in Sec. Regulation & M&A (May 22, 2015) [hereinafter Interview with
M&A Lawyer] (Mr. Porter is a retired partner from global law firm Jones Day where he
practiced corporate finance and M&A). This is because once the decision is known, it
would be hard to imagine a founder, for example, in the preferred stock venture capitalist
sector saying that although there is a recent court decision on point, we will refuse to
include a provision to protect the preferred stockholder. See David Gammell et al.,
American Bar Association Business Law Section & Center for Professional Development,
Drafting a Stronger Preferred Stock: Responses to Recent Case Law Developments (2014)
(recording on file with publication) (detailing contractual protections for preferred stock
that respond to recent court decisions).
21. See Ronald J. Coffey, Firm Opportunities: Property Right Assignments, Firm
Detriment, and the Agent's PerformanceObligation, 13 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 155, 180 n.64 (1988)
[hereinafter Coffey, Firm Opportunities].
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In some contexts, such as public preferred stock relegating the
preferred to a contractual solution or another private solution such as
board control or a discount stock purchase, may not be feasible for large
classes of preferred. In these cases, where the common controlled board
might either intentionally elect to injure the preferred or engage in an
outrageous or reckless investment strategy 22 that would only be
rational when viewed exclusively from the perspective of the common,
and would be viewed as grossly irrational by a prudent investor, there
should be an implied duty. Thus, a limited fiduciary protection for the
preferred that rules out reckless investment should be implied. In such
cases, even if the board's duty is to maximize the long-term wealth of
the entity, there is some board action that is so reckless that no
reasonable person would have taken the action and the board should
not be immunized from liability. If no duty to the.preferred is implied in
such cases, the incentive to invest as preferred stockholders may be
significantly dampened.
Moreover, in many contexts, even if the preferred wanted to bargain
for protection against reckless behavior, and even if they had the clout
to extract a promise against such behavior (an unlikely scenario where
in many contexts the preferred have zero clout), structural barriers
prevent the preferred from acting since the party that contracts with
the preferred holders through selling shares-the firm-is not the
perpetrator or beneficiary of the wrongful behavior. Further, neither
the common stock nor the directors are in privity with the preferred. So,
there is reason to think that a contractual solution is not feasible and
that adding protection against reckless behavior would be consistent
with maximizing value since retaining a right to act recklessly does not
maximize firm value.
Another context in which the ordinary rules relegating preferred to
their contractual solution involves a family business in which preferred
is issued to certain family members who play an inactive role in a
company founded by a parent and common stock is issued to the
children playing an active role in management. The argument that no
duties should be owed to those who purchased on the assumption that
they would be afforded no protection beyond the contractual terms
seems to make no sense at all since in such contexts, where the
preferred are gifted preferred stock, they did not negotiate the terms of

22. See Porges v. Vadsco Sales Corp., 32 A.2d 148, 151 (Del. Ch. 1943) (citing
"reckless indifference to the rights of others"); see also Julian Velasco, How Many
Fiduciary Duties Are There in Corporate Law, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 1231, 1253 (2010)
(discussing the fact "that courts generally do reserve the right to review the substance of
business decisions, at least in the most extreme cases").
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their investment. Moreover, the key argument against implying
terms-that it causes a hit to the other (common) stockholders-has
less power here where the other (common) stockholders were given
their stock by a parent and thus did not have their investment devalued
by the imposition of additional burdens.
Thus, this Article will argue that the general rule relegating
preferred exclusively to contractual protections should not govern all
instances of preferred stockholding, but should depend on the context in
which the stock is issued. Previous commentators have treated all
preferred stockholders as a class without differentiating between the
different contexts involving preferred stock. 23 This omission has caused
many commentators to overstate the vulnerability of preferred and to
advocate for protective strategies for all classes of preferred. However,
the ability of preferred varies significantly in different contexts and
those circumstances require a more nuanced approach to preferred
shareholder protection.
Part I will lay out the general circumstances that warrant an
implied fiduciary duty in the corporate context and use a principalagent framework to assess whether and why an implied fiduciary duty
will maximize wealth for equity holders. Part II then re-examines the
fiduciary duty in the context of a corporation with multiple claimants to
see how conflicts can arise between multiple constituencies-different
classes of equity holders. It addresses what analysis should determine
whether an action that adversely affects one class of equity holders, but
is still in the best interests of the firm, is consistent with the agent's
duties. It briefly discusses an early example of investor conflict in the
Dodge24 case to outline the proper role of an agent in such conflicts. Had
the lawyer and client been more skilled in identifying the value of
accumulating cash as an option for positioning the firm to seize on
future opportunities, the board's decision might have been immune
from the allegations of the minority common stockholder. Where the
adversely affected party can protect itself through contract or other
means, making the agent liable under a fiduciary obligation would not
minimize costs. But where such contractual protections are not possible

23. See, e.g., Korsmo, supra note 7, at 1166.
24. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919). Dodge is an example where
had the lawyer or client wanted to do so, they could have convinced the court that even if
the minority stockholder was adversely affected by the board's decision to retain cash, the
decision was still consonant with a pursuit of long-term value for the firm and thus within
the board's allowable discretion. Had the court focused on comparing the present value of
alternative future return stream strategies embraced by the competing common
stockholders, it might have reached a different result.
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and there is an adverse effect on one claimant, a limited fiduciary
protection for the preferred might be wealth enhancing.
Part III utilizes the analysis in Parts I and II to address fiduciary
duty in the case of multiple claimants but no inter-investor conflict. It
explains why all investors, regardless of type, are entitled to benefit
from a rule against waste or depletion of the assets of the firm and
against coercion. 25 It is a vertical duty owed by the firm's agents to all
stockholders.
Part IV uses the prior analyses in Parts I-III to assess the results
in several recent Delaware cases involving the fiduciary duty issue in
conflicts between
venture capitalist
preferred and common
stockholders. It concludes that the results maximize welfare since
granting an ex post fiduciary protection to the preferred would likely be
re-contracted around in future cases, whereas a contrary result would
cause an immediate hit to the common stockholders and would not be
cost minimizing. These cases should be easy cases to decide under a cost
minimizing analytical structure.
Part V examines different types of preferred stock settings where
the feasibility of contractual protection, pricing discounts, or yield
adjustments may be particularly difficult or where contractual
protection, if even feasible, would not offer an adequate remedy as
where the preferred has no contract claim against the board. In such
cases, if the board recklessly pursues a "Hail Mary" option with an
infinitesimal chance of succeeding that might result in a payoff for the
common but would certainly wipe out all value for the preferred, a
narrowly tailored fiduciary protection should be adopted in that subset
of non-VC preferred stock cases where contractual protection for the
investor against wealth shifting is not realistic. In such narrow cases, a
limited fiduciary protection against reckless investments would be
wealth maximizing.26
I. JUSTIFICATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR LAW-SUPPLIED TERM:
THE FIDUCIARY DUTY
Before deciding whether the law should imply a fiduciary duty to
the preferred beyond the duty owed to all stockholders, one must first
understand the ultimate premise of any exchange-that parties to an

25. See Gradient OC Master, Ltd. v. NBC Universal, Inc., 930 A.2d 104, 117 (Del. Ch.
2007) ("In that regard, this Court has recognized that preferred shareholders share the
same right as common shareholders to be free from wrongful coercion in a stockholder
vote.").
26. See WILLIAMSON, supranote 10, at 20-22, 48-49.
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exchange will seek to minimize the transaction costs of the exchange as
a way of maximizing the surplus available. That premise, together with
the reality that "a 'fiduciary' relation is a contractual one characterized
by unusually high costs of specification and monitoring," 27 explain why
the law supplies a fiduciary duty28 to govern an agent's actions toward

any investor when the agent has discretion over a pool of assets.29 If
that discretion is not constrained, there will be a contractual hazardan agency cost-that will constitute a cost and decrease surplus from
the exchange.
Agency costs affect all types of investors and stock. 30 When the
investor furnishes resources and delegates discretion to make decisions
over how to use the assets for a firm, there is necessarily a "separation
of ownership and control." 3 ' Another critical component to this agency
relationship "involves delegating some decision making authority to the
agent." 32 The agent who receives a fixed wage may take actions that

diverge from the principal's interest, a type of agency cost. The agent
may not exert as much effort as the principal would like (shirking) or
may expropriate assets to his or her own private benefit. These risks
can all be categorized as involving a propensity to diverge 33 or moral
hazard. 34 These agency risks constitute costs that reduce the surplus
27. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and FiduciaryDuty, 36 J.L.
& ECON. 425, 427 (1993) [hereinafter Contractand FiduciaryDuty].
28. "[T]he primary non-ballot box legal constraint on [the directors] is the
enforcement of their equitable fiduciary duties." See Leo E. Strine, Jr. et al., Loyalty's
Core Demand: The Defining Role of Good Faith in CorporationLaw, 98 GEO. L.J. 629, 641
(2010). In Delaware it was developed as a means of "ensuring that the capacious authority
granted to directors by the DGCL [Delaware General Corporation Law] was not misused."
Id. at 642.
29. The willingness of the law to supply a fiduciary obligation to constrain an agent
with discretion over the assets of the principal goes back in time to the law of merchants
and its custom to constrain agents by way of a performance obligation. See AVNER GREIF,
INSTITUTIONS AND THE PATH TO THE MODERN ECONOMY: LESSONS FROM MEDIEVAL TRADE

70 (2006). The performance obligation adopted then was to enhance the growth, surplus,
and wealth effects in the context of a particular instance of exchange of a commission paid
by a delegating principal for the services rendered by the agent.
30. "[F]irms with lower expected agency problems have higher expected values."
DOUGLAS

J. CUMMING & SOFIA A. JOHAN, VENTURE CAPITAL AND PRIVATE EQUITY

CONTRACTING: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 56 (2d ed. 2014); see also Michael C.
Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs
and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308-09 (1976).
31. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 30, at 308-09.
32. Id. at 308.
33. E-mail from Ronald J. Coffey, Professor of Law Emeritus, Case W. Reserve Univ.
Sch. of Law, to Kenneth Davis, Professor of Law, Univ. of Wis. Sch. of Law (Jan. 27, 2005)
(on file with author).
34. Moral hazard is a type of opportunistic behavior. In the context of insurance, it
refers to the failure of insured persons "to behave in a fully responsible way and take
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from any exchange involving a principal and agent.35 Yet, since there is
a benefit to giving the agent discretion over the assets, the discretion
will persist. 36
In determining whether to supply a performance obligation that the
parties did not bargain for in corporate contexts, the basic structure for
implied terms is the same as in the context of contracts. We start with
the question of why and "how .

.

. fiduciary duties sneak into these

contracts"3 7 between managers or directors and investors. In these
consensual, bargained-for contexts, the answer to this fundamental
question of why the law supplies a fiduciary duty depends on the
recognition that corporations are "enduring (relational) contracts" 38 and
"the proposition that people cannot see the future well enough to
resolve all contingencies ahead of time."3 9 Between the managers and
the equity holders of the residual claims, "[t]he only promise that makes
sense in such an open-ended relation is to work hard and honestly." 40
There is a recurring risk of opportunistic behavior or moral hazard.
The question in the principal-agent context is always the same: why did
the parties not reach a more pointedly reciprocal exchange? It may be
because the very same terms of a generalized performance commitment
are of such a general nature that the parties did not think it necessary
to bargain to control the behavior. Parties would not think to bargain in
instances where there is a recurring threat of opportunism that is
virtually the same throughout a class of transactions, namely, those in
appropriate risk-mitigating actions" once covered under an insurance policy. See
WILLIAMSON, supra note 10, at 47. Moral hazard problems also arise in the principalagent context; the principal cannot directly see the agent's actions and the agent cannot
discern whether the poor outcomes are due to lack of effort or to exogenous events. See
David E. M. Sappington, Incentives in Principal-AgentRelationships, 5 J. ECON. PERSP.
45, 46-49 (1991) ("[T]he principal can't observe ... the level of effort exerted by the
agent."); see also Kenneth J. Arrow, The Economics of Agency, in PRINCIPALs AND AGENTS:
THE STRUCTURE OF BuSINESs 37, 37 (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1985)
("The principal cannot observe the actions themselves but may make some observations,
for example, of the output.").
35. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 10, at 17.
36. For a discussion of when optimal contracts can contain "two forms of
incompleteness: discretion, meaning that the contract does not specify the parties'
behavior with sufficient detail; and rigidity, meaning the parties' obligations are not
sufficiently contingent on the external state," see Pierpaolo Battigalli & Giovanni Maggi,
Rigidity, Discretion, and the Costs of Writing Contracts, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 798, 798-99
(2002).
37.

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FIsCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF

CORPORATE LAW 90 (1991) [hereinafter ECONOMIC STRUCTURE].
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 91; see also Contract and Fiduciary Duty, supra note 27, at 426 ("When one
party hires the other's knowledge and expertise, there is not much they can write down.").
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which the agent is given discretion over a pool of assets and there is
risk of a divergence between the interest of the agent and the
principal.4'
The commonplace nature of the threat of opportunism in a contract
or a propensity to diverge in an agency context and the costs of
negotiating express contractual controls that are meaningful may mean
that the most cost-effective way of controlling the behavior is a lawsupplied fiduciary obligation. To determine whether a law-supplied
obligation is efficient in the principal-agent relationship within the
corporate context using a welfare maximizing criterion--one that
determines whether the intervention will be welfare maximizing after
all costs of intervention are weighed against the cost of parties privately
solving certain problems that act as a drag on gains from trade-one
must first understand the nature of principal-agent relationship.
In addressing whether the law should intervene to ,supplement a
contract by implying a term or a fiduciary obligation, the overarching
question is: toward what ultimacy is the adjudicator justified in
cancelling or modifying express terms of an exchange institution, given
certain assumptions about reality? 42 In the context of exchange
transactions, the ultimacy would be the maximization of gains from
exchange. Resolving the impact of an intervention on that ultimacy
requires an analysis of the ex ante effects in future transactions and the
effects on parties' contracts in the future. Additionally, in settings
involving shareholders using the maximization directive, one must
assess
how
the
intervention
will
affect
different
constituencies/claimants with different risk/return features in their
arrangement with the firm. 43
This Article assumes that the law in this context should act "as an
instrument to promote the achievement of specifically identifiable
ultimate goals . . . selected as worthy by the decision-maker." 44 The
ultimacy here is to maximize gains from trade and to minimize the cost
of transacting 45 (in short to maximize welfare) and to increase those

41. E-mail from Ronald J. Coffey, Professor of Law Emeritus, Case W. Reserve Univ.
Sch. of Law, to Juliet P. Kostritsky, Professor of Law, Case W. Reserve Univ. Sch. of Law
(Aug. 19, 2008, 1:10 PM) (on file with author) [hereinafter Coffey E-mail] (discussing
legislatively supplied default rules as an alternative).
42. Ronald J. Coffey, Perspectives on Legal Methods 1 (Feb. 4, 1992) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
43. See infra Section W.A.
44. See Coffey, supra note 42, at 3.
45. The efforts to minimize transaction costs by parties are driven by a desire to
increase the surplus from exchange. These costs have been neglected. See WILLIAMSON,
supranote 10, at 17.
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gains using certain assumptions about reality. Assumptions about
reality include the impediments to bargaining as well as the likely
future effects of law-supplied intervention on parties' behavior-i.e.,
would they contract around the rule?
Parties will seek to minimize these agency costs to increase the
surplus from exchange. 46 Yet, attempting to control the effort of the
agent is costly or unobtainable through contract because one cannot
contract on effort. 47 Effort remains unverifiable to a court even if it is
observable by the principal.4 8 Because a contracting solution is
unobtainable, the principal will seek to reduce those costs in other
ways, such as by monitoring the agent or devising incentive alignment
schemes to better align the agent's efforts with the principal's
objectives. 49 So while, theoretically, the parties could control agency
costs through contract, financial economics suggests that "[c]ontracts
can be designed to enable a principal to mitigate agency problems, but
agency problems can never be fully eliminated."5 0
In the context of a corporation/firm with common stockholders
investing and delegating discretion to the agent, the law has resolved
that the principal duty of the board is to maximize the firm's value and
it furnishes a judicially supplied fiduciary obligation to constrain the
actions of the agent.51 Section 379 of the Restatement (Second) of

46. The inability to control agency costs by contract leads Easterbrook and Fischel to
embrace the hypothetical bargain contract as the basis for fiduciary duties. "A court
setting out to protect principals from their agents must use the hypothetical contract
approach; the only alternative is to injure the persons the rule makers want to help."
Contractand FiduciaryDuty, supra note 27, at 431.
47. The inability of the principal to observe the effort of the agent and the
implications of that fact for contracting schemes to incentivize agents is explored in
Sappington, supra note 34, at 46-49.
48. For an insightful discussion of the non-verifiability of effort problem in the context
of the principal agent relationship of employer and employee, see Stewart J. Schwab, LifeCycle Justice:Accommodating Just Cause and Employment at Will, 92 MICH. L. REV. 8, 20
(1993); see also Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Incomplete Contracts and the Theory
of Contract Design, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 187, 191 (2005) (explaining that "back-end
obstacles have driven a large body of the theorists' models: namely, that some states of
the world are not verifiable to a court, even though they may be observable to both the
parties").
49. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 30, at 308. These are known as mechanism
design incentive alignment schemes in the agency literature. For a discussion of the
difficulties of incentive alignment schemes, see Juliet P. Kostritsky, Bargaining with
Uncertainty, Moral Hazard, and Sunk Costs: A Default Rule for Precontractual
Negotiations, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 621, 659 n. 142 (1993) [hereinafter Kostritsky, Bargaining
with Uncertainty].
50. CUMMING & JOHAN, supra note 30, at 44.
51. See Contractand FiduciaryDuty, supra note 27, at 426 (explaining the "fiduciary"
package and the "duty of loyalty" as one that both principal and agent enter for gain).
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Agency 5 2 operates in a similar fashion. In such settings, there are

pervasive barriers to common stock shareholders controlling, by express
and detailed contracts, all of the various ways in which the agent may
diverge and shirk due to the problems of bounded rationality and
uncertainty. The prospect of this propensity to diverge, which is
endemic to situations involving a separation of ownership and control55
and a human tendency toward opportunism, has a downward effect on
the present value of the exchange institution at the time of formation.
In those circumstances, the law supplies the fiduciary obligation to
prevent that loss in value. The assumption is that the parties
themselves would have agreed to a fiduciary obligation to control the
propensity to diverge were it not for barriers to including it expressly.
As Easterbrook and Fischel assert, "[t]he fiduciary principle is an
alternative to elaborate promises and extra monitoring." 54
In addition to the problems of bounded rationality and uncertainty,
common stock shareholders are dispersed.5 5 Thus, it may be difficult for
them to act together as a single holder capable of bargaining effectively
to negotiate the contractual provisions that control agency costs.
Moreover, in the case of a common stock shareholder principal
delegating discretion to the agent, he may assume that the problem of
agency costs is so pervasive and so obvious that courts will necessarily
police against such behavior as part of its equitable jurisdiction. The
commonplace quality of such terms may explain why the transactorscommon stockholders-did not bother to explicate the risk in their
bargain.
Of course, the principal could monitor or screen the agent to find
out his or her "propensit[y] to diverge."56 The principal could also adjust
the compensation paid to the agent to compensate for the divergence.
The principal could use incentive schemes to compensate the agent for
effort or results. These are all private strategies that the parties could
use to control agency costs; however, they are all costly and subject to
budget constraints. First, the agent may have information that the
principal does not have about the actions taken. The agent may not

52.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY

§

379 (AM. LAW INST. 1958); see also

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.08 (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
53.
See generally ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS,
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 119 (1932).

THE MODERN

54. ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 37, at 92.
55. CORPORATE LAW AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 91 (Lucian Arye Bebchuk ed., 1990).
56. For a discussion of these private devices to reduce the costs of unremedied
shirking, see Kostritsky, Bargaining with Uncertainty, supra note 49, at 655-57, 655
n.126.
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work for a knocked down wage.5 7 Also, express contracts may be too
costly because the agent's decision-making will depend on information
not available at the time the agent is engaged. In adopting the fiduciary
obligation to govern the discretion of the agent toward common
stockholders, the law supplies a term to deal with a recurring problem
of the "propensity to diverge"58 and thus reduces agency costs. The issue
for the courts or the legislature supplying a fiduciary obligation is
whether the performance obligation introduces new costs that offset or
exceed the benefits of the law-supplied term.
II. COMPLICATING THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT RELATIONSHIP;
MULTIPLE CLAIMANTS

Understanding whether an adjudicator should add to or cancel
terms in the corporate context-by implying a fiduciary duty to increase
gains from trade, and maximize welfare by constraining shirking, moral
hazard, and opportunism-requires an analysis of the principal-agent
aspect of investment contracts: the delegation issue. This is the basic
separation of ownership and control discussed in the preceding section.
When an investor furnishes resources (perhaps cash), the firm
issues stock and gives the investors claims against the firm. Separate
issues, apart from the basic fiduciary duty, arise from the fact that
different classes of stockholders have different risk/return preferences.5 9
Then, all investments, regardless of the risk/return profile differences,
involve the investor in a principal-agent relationship with the
management of the firm.60 The agent begins controlling the asset pool
and takes over management of the firm, which provides the source of
return streams to the claimants or investors. The agent is also tasked

57.

See Benjamin Klein, Contracting Costs and Residual Claims: The Separation of

Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & EcoN. 367, 368 (1983) (noting that cutting the worker's
wage will not solve the problem of shirking "because the gain to the shirker and therefore
his acceptable compensating wage discount is less than the cost to the firm from the
shirking behavior").
58. Coffey E-mail, supra note 41.
59. See, e.g., Korsmo, supra note 7, at 1179 (discussing different risk preferences
between preferred and common). The conflict need not be there. One could have only a
single class of stock or dual classes of common stock but the principal-agent framework
would still be applicable. The divergence in risk/return preferences and the implications
of those divergences will be explored in the section on horizontal conflicts. The common
stockholder wants higher risk/higher return and the preferred stockholder wants lower
risk/lower return.
60. See Douglas G. Baird & M. Todd Henderson, Other People's Money, 60 STAN. L.
REV. 1309, 1310 (2008); see also ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 37, at 91 (1991) ("[T]he
corporate contract makes managers the agents of the equity investors . . . .").
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with honoring the terms of the claims of the different types of
investors.6' The agent's operation of the firm affects the total value of
the firm and the aggregate value of the different types of claims against
the firm. 62

Recognizing this agency relationship and the different risk/return
features that each stakeholder has depends on the terms of her claims
against the global return stream of the firm and the different set of
variables in terms of timing, amount, and uncertainty for each
stakeholder. This has ramifications for the types of obligations the
agent owes the principals in the context of the agent making various
decisions in the corporate context for multiple constituencies. The global
value for the firm is the present value of a future stream of returns.
One controversy is how the agent for principals with multiple
competing objectives should act on behalf of the claimants and whether
the court should imply terms for a set of claimants beyond: (1) the
fiduciary duty applicable to all claimants, and (2) any specially
negotiated contract provisions for particular claimants. The
determining principle would be whether the intervention/rule
maximizes value and welfare for the firm and equity value as a whole.
Understanding the centrality of the principal-agent relationship
will helpfully reorient the thinking away from whether a board action
"harms" one adversely affected class to analyzing what a board must do
to fulfill its duties as agent for the firm when there are multiple
constituencies. Even under the doctrine of common shareholder wealth
maximization as a means of maximizing the long-term value of the
firm, the board can shift value from present to future stockholders and
can wipe out the value of the common when it is in the best interests of
the firm. 63 As agent, the board can make changes in the asset pool that
negatively affect some classes without sacrificing value.6 4 In
determining value one must be able to compare and compute the

61. All of these claimants or stakeholders have a different set of variables in terms of
the projected timing, amount, and uncertainty depending on its claims against the global
return stream from the firm. Under value maximization theory, "managers should make
all decisions so as to increase the total long-run market value of the firm. Total value is
the sum of all values of all financial claims on the firm-including equity, debt, preferred
stock, and warrants." Jensen, supra note 11, at 236 (emphasis omitted).
62. See EUGENE F. FAMA & MERTON H. MILLER, THE THEORY OF FINANCE 67-77
(1972).
63. See Orban v. Field, No. 12820, 1997 WL 153831, at *8 (Del. Ch. Apr. 1, 1997) ("A
board may certainly deploy corporate power against its own shareholders in some
circumstances-the greater good justifying the action-but when it does, it should be
required to demonstrate that it acted both in good faith and reasonably.").
64. See Coffey, Firm Opportunities, supra note 21, at 168-69.
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present values of alternative future return stream strategies. 65 To
dutifully operate the firm and manage the asset pool, the board must be
free to engage in strategies that adversely impact some classes of
claimants if the strategy is minimizing the cost of exchange and
maximizing the gains from exchange and production. Any other
strategy would be disfavored ex ante by the claimants. One example
involves common stockholders and a possible judicial rule outlawing
corporate action that would wipe out the common stock. This option
would outlaw such action even if such action were in the best interests
of the corporation. Although ex post common stockholders would want
such a rule, ex ante they would disfavor it since such a pro-common
stockholder rule would actually make it harder to get financing from
banks, debt, and preferred stock. Those costs might outweigh the
benefits of the law-supplied protective rule.
Many possible combinations of investments exist and finding a
breach of some non-contractual or fiduciary obligation whenever one
class of investors would prefer a different choice would add significantly
to the cost of exchange and thus would not be preferred ex ante, at least
where the class of investors adversely affected could anticipate the risk
and provide for it by contract or buy the stock at a discount to
compensate for the risk.
III. WHEN ARE FIDUCIARY DUTIES OWED TO ALL SHAREHOLDERS AND
WHY: THE VERTICAL CONFLICT WITH MULTIPLE CLAIMANTS BUT No
INTER-INVESTOR CONFLICTS

When there are multiple claimants who have furnished resources to
a firm, they will hold different types of investments with different
terms/claims. Some will invest with loans and take bonds in return. In
that case, the bondholders' investments are governed almost entirely by
detailed express contracts.66 Others will take an ownership interest by
investing and be furnished stock in return. Here, both common
stockholders and preferred stockholders face the prospect of agency
costs as they furnish resources to an agent who may have a propensity
to diverge.67 The inability to foresee all of the agent's possible choices

65. See Coffey E-mail, supranote 41.
66. See David M.W. Harvey, Bondholders' Rights and the Case for a Fiduciary Duty,
65 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 1023, 1037-39 (1991) (referring to the ability of bondholders to
achieve "optimal" contracts).
67. Coffey E-mail, supranote 41.
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will interfere with the ability of a contract to expressly control all the
potential varieties of agency costs. 6 8

If obstacles exist to contractual controls of agency costs of a
principal (any furnisher of resources who receives stock in return),
across different principal-agent relationships, two questions arise: (1)
are there reasons to think that the law could have a beneficial welfare
maximizing role to play in controlling agency costs by supplying a term
to control the behavior of the agent by furnishing a rule whose content
prevents risks such as the misappropriation or theft of the asset pool;
and (2) would the answer to that question differ if it arose in the context
of a board who was acting as an agent for two classes of shareholders
who had different interests and different risk/return profiles and where
the agent could take actions that had reverberative effects on one
claimant while having no effect on the value of the firm?
In the case where the agent has been tasked with managing the
asset pool and engages in actions that are wasteful or deplete the assets
of the firm, all classes of claimants are protected.69 Actions against
directors for misappropriation make sense in terms of the principalagent model and the fiduciary duty analyzed in the preceding section.
Because the director is the agent for the resources furnished by
different classes of investors, all investors are equally entitled to sue
the director/agent for breach of the duty of loyalty when assets are
misappropriated. 70 That type of conduct would be contrary to the
agent's fundamental duty of loyalty to care for assets and invest them
for the firm. This type of lawsuit against a firm's agent for waste is
classified as a vertical conflict.7 1 Each class of preferred or common is
owed a duty of loyalty by the agent (a vertical relationship) not to
misappropriate

or steal assets from the firm.7 2 A duty of loyalty

"demands that a fiduciary make a good faith effort to advance the best
interests of the corporation and its stockholders." 73 All who have
68.

See Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its

Economic Characterand Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1048 (1991).

.

69. Professor Coffey explains the particular harm suffered by the "disposition of firm
assets" as follows: "[Tihe firm is necessarily exposed to the possibility not only of
surrendering a portion of the total gains from exchange that may inhere in the
transaction, but also of suffering outright wealth transfers." Coffey, Firm Opportunities,
supranote 21, at 159-60 (footnote omitted).
70. See Mitchell, supra note 6, at 463 (citing Rosan v. Chi. Milwaukee Corp., C.A. No.
10526, 1990 WL 13482, at *7-8 (Del. Ch. Feb. 6, 1990) ("[The court [in Rosan] refused to
dismiss the preferred stockholder's derivative claim of corporate waste . .
71. Id. at 449-50.
72. Id. at 463.
73. Strine et al., supra note 28, at 635. The Model Business Corporation Act stresses
that "a lack of good faith is presented where a board 'lacked an actual intention to advance
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invested in a pool of assets to produce a future stream of returns for the
claimants are entitled to expect that the agent will use the assets for
the firm and not misappropriate them.
In this class of cases, the law intervenes with implied duties to
prevent waste and misappropriation of assets. The conduct is so
pervasive that one would anticipate that the law would intervene to
control it rather than making every stockholder negotiate directly for
such protection when the risk is endemic and a result of the structural
separation of ownership and control and of the risk of opportunism. The
same justification may explain why the law supplies bankruptcy
protections to all holders of debt rather than forcing each to negotiate
for bankruptcy priorities. 74 Forcing such bargaining to gain protection
against a common and recurrent risk, such as expropriation (or a fight
for the assets among creditors faced with an insolvent company), would
be costly and might deter parties from investing ex ante and act as a
drag on gains from trade that would discourage investment.
Implying a duty that protects against waste is consistent with the
duty to maximize welfare, and the risk/return profile differences among
different classes of claimants would not alter the nature of the duty
owed to protect the asset pool. Both classes of stockholders, whatever
their risk/return profile, would not want the firm to have the assets
depleted since those assets will furnish the pool from which each
claimant calculates value.
IV. HORIZONTAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN PREFERRED AND
COMMON STOCKHOLDERS

A.

The Basic Approach to Preferred ShareholderRights: Contractual
Rights Plus Implied Duties to All Shareholders

If the furnishers of resources-the principals-are preferred
stockholders, do they, and should they, get the benefit of any lawsupplied rules in their favor? According to case law, courts find that if
the preferred are invoking rights that they share with the common
stockholders, then they benefit from a law-supplied rule in their favor
corporate welfare."' Id. at 665 (quoting the MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.31(a)(2)(i) cmt. at 868 (AM. BAR ASS'N, 2005)).

74. See Stanley D. Longhofer, Bankruptcy Rules and Debt Contracting: On the
Relative Efficiency of Absolute Priority, Proportionate Priority, and First-Come, FirstServed Rules 1-5 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Working Paper No. 9415, 1994),
https://www.clevelandfed.org/en/newsroom-and-events/publications/working-papers/
working-papers-archives/1994-working-papers/wp-9415-bankruptcy-rules-and-debtcontracting-on-the-relative-efficiency-of-absolute-priority.aspx.
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that extends to common and preferred shareholders alike.75 Thus, in
cases of vertical conflict, where the agent misappropriates or wastes
assets, the preferred can sue just like common stockholders. The
justification for the law-supplied rule lies in the supposition that an
implied duty to control that behavior is wealth enhancing for the firm.
As one scholar has noted, courts in confronting implied duties must
always ask: "Improvement in the achievement of what ultimacy
justifies an adjudicator's addition, cancellation, or modification of
express terms negotiated during an exchange and what assumptions
about reality76 must be entertained to demonstrate the improvement?

This is hereinafter referred to as the vaulting question ("VQ")."77
However, the preferred stockholders may want a court to go beyond
both the duties owed to all stockholders, including the common, not to
waste assets and to maximize value for the firm and the common
stockholders. Preferred holders may want protections beyond the
express terms negotiated in their preferred stock agreement that imply
additional protections for the preferred. Preferred stockholders will
likely seek such protection when their interests diverge from those of
common stockholders.
Whether the law should intervene to supplement the preferred
stock's bargain, which consists of statutory terms, additional contract
terms, and regulatory rules that govern such stock, has prompted a
flurry of different approaches. Some authors urge courts to employ a
good faith scrutiny to conflicts between preferred and common stock to

75. See Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A.2d 584, 594 (Del. Ch. 1986)
("[W]here however the right asserted is not to a preference as against the common stock
but rather a right shared equally with the common, the existence of such right and the
scope of the correlative duty may be measured by equitable as well as legal standards.").
76. Assumptions about reality must include an assessment of what goals parties have
and how they will react to legal rules. This Article assumes that rational actors will seek
to maximize the joint benefits of their exchanges. Under neoclassical economics, actors
exhibit a "maximizing orientation." WILLIAMSON, supra note 10, at 44-45.
77. See E-mail from Ronald J. Coffey, Professor of Law Emeritus, Case W. Reserve
Univ. Sch. of Law, to Juliet P. Kostritsky, Professor of Law, Case W. Reserve Univ. Sch. of
Law (July 20, 2015, 10:44 AM) (on file with author). In several instances, authors writing
about preferred stock have argued for additional legal protection to prevent oppression of
the preferred or to police against specific types of bad conduct, such as opportunistic
amendment, see, e.g., Bratton & Wachter, supra note 2, at 1856-57; Mitchell, supra note
6, at 473, without addressing the VQ, so it is unclear under such analyses if the protection
would be welfare enhancing ex ante. Without using the analysis suggested here, one
cannot decide whether intervention would be value enhancing, so it would be premature
to decide whether protection is needed. Of course, ex post, the preferred want additional
protection. A court however must address whether ex ante the parties would have
bargained for such protection and, if so, what would they have given up to secure that
protection? Would the tradeoff have been worth it?
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avoid results that are not value maximizing in the aggregate.78 Others
argue that courts should never afford preferred protection beyond the
ordinary fiduciary protection afforded all stockholders or the special
contractual provisions-known as the contractual rights, limitations
and preferences, ("CRPLs")-negotiated by the issuer and the preferred
stockholder.79 One critic argues for a "division of board control between
80
the two classes of equity . . . to ensure their harmonious co-existence."

Chancellor Strine, of the Delaware Court of Chancery, however, opposes
such suggestions and argues that subjecting agents to heightened
scrutiny under new standards of review will start courts on an
unguided "speculative journey." 81
To determine which of these approaches should govern or whether a
new approach is called for, the next section of the Article will develop a
framework for analyzing this question of duties of the board between
two sets of claimants, who have different risk/return profiles and who
have accordingly negotiated different terms of their claims (in their
contracts) on the asset pool to reflect those differences. The Article will
revisit a case involving dual classes of common stock and then examine
several recent cases involving conflicts between preferred and. common
stockholders. Reforms affecting preferred should be evaluated using the
analytical tools outlined for all law-supplied terms. The principal
components which will resolve these conflicts are the principal-agent
frame, the VQ-an analysis of whether an implied term's benefits will
exceed any costs from the term-and a recognition of the different
risk/return profiles held by different claimants. 82 When there are
multiple competing objectives or multiple constituencies, as with
preferred and common stock, there are two dominant theories of what
should govern the director's duty: (1) value maximization for the firm;

78. Bratton and Wachter want a protective good faith obligation to ensure that the
common cannot force the preferred to wait to cash out. See Bratton & Wachter, supranote
2, at 1906. Of course, as Chancellor Strine points out, the preferred could avoid the wait
by negotiating a provision that forced a liquidation. Whether good faith is really an
additional obligation or is subsumed under the larger duty of loyalty is explored by Strine
et al., supra note 28. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Poor Pitiful or Potently Powerful Preferred?,
161 U. PA. L. REV. 2025, 2035 (2013), for a discussion of the difficulties with an
untethered good faith scrutiny of board action toward the preferred.
79. Korsmo, supra note 7, at 1166.
80. Ben Walther, The Peril and Promise of Preferred Stock, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 161,
165 (2014).
81. Strine, supranote 78, at 2036.
82. Differences exist as to the claimants' present value of the stream of returns from
the asset pool based on the individual preferences on timing, uncertainty, and amount of
those returns. The firm has a present value of that income stream based on global values
assigned to timing, uncertainty, and amount of returns for the firm.
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or (2) value for a stakeholder who has a different set of variables in
terms of timing, amount, and uncertainty than the firm. This Article
endorses (1). Other issues which bear on the horizontal conflicts
include: which class of investors controls the directors, the effect of the
tradeoff between risk and return under conditions of uncertainty on the
agent's decisions for the firm, the duties owed to all equity holders, and
the effect of express terms on the resolution of conflicts between
investors. These issues all surface in the context of whether the law
should add to or cancel terms negotiated by the parties, particularly
preferred shareholders. The effects of any judicial intervention on the
capital markets will also be considered, as an integral part of any
wealth enhancing analysis.
Potential conflicts between the interests of the preferred and the
common may arise in cases where: (1) the preferred has voting control
of the company's board and takes action favoring the preferred so that
the concern is for ill treatment of the common; (2) the same case as (1),
but the directors, once elected, act against the preferred in favor of the
common but not in direct violation of any contract rights; or (3) same as
(2), but the directors act against the common and the preferred. In a
second class of cases: (Bl) the common has voting control of the
company and the board takes action favoring the common, so there is
concern that the board is abusing the preferred; (B2) the common has
voting control and the directors, once elected, act against the interest of
the common; or (B3) same as (B2), but the directors, once elected, act
against the common and preferred. In a third scenario there is a
standoff as no one class controls the directors and the directors favor
one class or another, or favor themselves.
All of these scenarios raise the issue of what principles and
armature should govern the board as it acts as an agent for both
preferred and common when their interests conflict. In analyzing how
these conflicts should be resolved, one should consider the statutory
directives that the board must act in the best interests of the
corporation. The language in the Model Business Corporations Act
("MBCA"), for example, is in section 8.30(a) and reads "[e]ach member
of the board of directors, when discharging the duties of a director, shall
act (1) in good faith, and (2) in a manner the director reasonably
believes to be in the best interests of the corporation." 83 Despite many

83. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.30(a) (AM. BAR ASs'N, 2005); see also OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 1701.59 (LexisNexis 2009) (Supp. 2014) ("(B) A director shall perform the
director's duties as a director, including the duties as a member of any committee of the
directors upon which the director may serve, in good faith, in a manner the director
reasonably believes to be in or not opposed to the best interests of the corporation, and
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opportunities to amend that language,8 4 the drafters have not added
language saying that the director should act to maximize the interests
of one class of claimants or the other, so acting in the best interests of
the corporation is the key important factor. This fact may help to
resolve whether a cause of action should exist or a term should be added
to constrain the agent-the board-to protect one class from another
when the action taken by an agent does not negatively impact the asset
pool or the firm. Regardless of which investor class controls the board,
is there a cause of action when the agent-the board-takes actions
that negatively impact one group of stockholders? How does the answer
change if the negatively affected class is in control of the board? How
does the answer change if the agent is not disinterested because of a
conflict of interest?85
When there are two investors rather than a single claimant, an
agent is making all the tradeoffs that a single investor would make if he
were both operating the firm and investing. In the process of making
choices about how to invest the pool of assets and what projects to
pursue for the firm, the agent-the board-considers all sort of
combinations of investment strategies. In making these determinations
about the asset pool, the agent might consider the different
characteristics of investors, wealth shifting issues, and the agent's
duties to the firm and to the pool of assets.

with the care that an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use under similar
circumstances. A director serving on a committee of directors is acting as a director.").
84. There are many opportunities to amend the MCBA and the MCBA is amended
regularly just as there are multiple opportunities to amend the tax code. See, for example,
the proposed 2016 revision of the MCBA. See also J.W. Verret, Pandora'sBallot Box, or a
Proxy with Moxie? Majority Voting, Corporate Ballot Access, and the Legend of Martin
Lipton Re-Examined, 62 BUS. LAW. 1057 (2007) (discussing an amendment to the DGCL).
85. In resolving these conflicts, one must also consider whether the board is
disinterested enough to make a decision. If the directors own a particular type of stock
and the decision they are making will have a material effect on their wealth, then the
directors are not disinterested as they will profit if one class of claimants is favored over
another. In such cases the transactions must meet an entire fairness standard. The entire
fairness standard applies "[b]ecause even a subjectively well-motivated fiduciary might
deal with himself less aggressively than he would with a third party." Strine et al., supra
note 28, at 643.
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86. Figure 1 is a diagram from Professor Ronald J. Coffey. He explains:
1. Any four-cornered box . .. is a person, either a natural or a non-natural person.
2. Any circle . .. is an asset (property: tangible, intangible, real, financialincluding claims, of various terms, against another person). It is an asset of the
person inside whose box it is located. The terms of the claims need to be
elaborated for each type of claim. Terms fall into two basic categories: right of
control ... and rights to distributions, both presently and in the future.
3. A single arrowhead pointing up against a person is a claim (set of rights
terms) held by some other person against the person to whom the arrow points
(obligor). At the other end of the shaft of the arrow is a circle in the box
representing the claimant, showing that the claim against the pointee (obligor) is
correlatively an asset of the person who holds (owns) it. Along the shaft of the
claim is a double arrow showing the direction of the transfer . . . to the person
who becomes the holding claimant.
4. In general, then, double arrows ... along lines . .. represent|] the direction
of movement in the transfer of an asset (upon origination or subsequently from
one holder to another).
5. There are four persons shown in the below very spare picture of the
resourcing (capitalization) of a firm. One may assume that it is in the corporate
form but a generalization beyond the corporate form is trivially easy, as can be
seen by reference to other versions of the delegation model, starting with a sole
proprietorship . . ..

6. In the topmost exchange institution, the symbols reflect the components of
the exchange and the resultant relationship. . . . The first line shows the issuance
(transfer) by the firm of a claim against the firm to Pp (Principal in the form of a
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In managing assets, the agent may consider that different classes of
investors have different desired outcomes in part influenced by the
investors' risk tolerance/risk aversion, linked to a targeted return. The
agent also considers the timeline of the investors, with common stock
and preferred stock having perpetually infinite investment periods.87 In
the diagram above involving a single agent and a common stockholder
and preferred stockholder, the agent is the delegate of two different
principals, who to suit (match) their diverse preferences, endowments,
and beliefs, have chosen to hold different types of claims with disparate
terms regarding control over the assets of the firm and over
distributions (particularly the time, amount, and uncertainty of the
latter).
Other factors drive investor differentiation. Employee/stock
investors prefer continuing employment-a non-monetary return.
Another non-monetary return often focuses on the founder's control of
the destiny of its "child" when it founds a company. Even preferred
investors may differ markedly, with late round investors looking for a
lower risk investment than earlier rounds.88
Differentiation among investors may affect the negotiated terms in
their contracts and the decisions the agent makes when it operates the
firm. It may also affect how courts evaluate the key question of whether

holder of preferred claim terms), which is shown as an asset (circle) of Pp (in Pp's
box). The other piece of the exchange is the transfer from Pp of something (cash,
nonservice intangibles, or human capital intangibles) to the firm, which
thereafter holds those things as its assets. Hence, the line through the asset circle
in the box representing Pp because the value furnished to the firm is no longer,
his, hers or its. The second exchange is "ditto" to the first. Pc (Principal who is
issued and becomes the holder of a residual (nonpreferred, common) claim
against the firm and, in exchange, transfers something. Ditto, therefore, except as
to the precise terms of the claims that are issued to Pc by the firm.
6. Agent is a person . .. given plenary and discretionary decisionmaking with
respect to the operation of the assets and the firm's financial matters.
7. This institution is at least one remove away from more primitive ones. An
agent here is the delegate of at least two different principals who, to suit (match)
their diverse preferences, endowments, and beliefs, have chosen to hold different
types [of] claims having disparate terms regarding control over the assets of the
firm and execution of the terms of claims . .. and distributions ....
Diagram and Comments by Professor Ronald J. Coffey, Professor Emeritus of Law
Emeritus, Case W. Reserve Sch. of Law (Feb. 19, 2016) (on file with author).
87. It is for this reason that preferred stockholders "ultimately need an exit vehicle."
See JOSEPH W. BARTLETT, FUNDAMENTALS OF VENTURE CAPITAL 87 (1999).

88. For a discussion of the differences between earlier and later rounds of VC
financing, see id. at 4 ('Some venture pools focus in whole or in part on late-round
investments: infusions of cash shortly before the company is planning to go public, for
example.").
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intervening to protect a particular class of investors will be efficient and
maximize total wealth.
In managing assets among classes of investors, the agent must not
only consider the differentiation among investors but also that the
agent has been tasked with managing the assets for the firm. That
means that the agent must be free to engage in projects because they
are in the best interests of the firm, even if there are some
reverberative, negative effects on different classes of investors. 89
Insights on the wealth shifting that can occur when agents make
choices help to make sense of the case law, statutory law, the business
judgment rule, and section 379 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency.90
These insights may also help a court understand how horizontal
conflicts between preferred stockholders and common stockholders
should be resolved, when the board is considered the agent of both
classes of investors investing in a single firm, under different state
regimes91 and under judicial case law refining which constituencies
should be viewed as first order beneficiaries and why. 92
If a firm has a project with a steady stream of returns and decides
to invest in a project with a higher risk profile, such as a hydrogen car,
there may, as far as the firm is concerned, be no value sacrificed in
terms of the asset pool. As one commentator noted, "firm pursuit of an
asset-side opportunity might be merely value-neutral for the firm and
simultaneously more-than-value-neutral for shareholders . . . where the
risk associated with returns to the firm from its operations is
increased." 93 However, there may be profound effects on the claimants.
In such a case the value of the senior claimants may go down while the
value of the common stock goes up. In these cases involving one or more
classes of investors, should the law intervene to protect one claimant
against the actions of the agent, and how does the principal-agent
frame affect the analysis? Further, how does an understanding of an

89. Coffey, Firm Opportunities, supra note 21, at 172-73.
90. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 379 (AM. LAW INST. 1958).
91. States might differ as to the primary purpose of a corporation. Over thirty states
have some version of a constituency statute that allows directors to consider factors other
than shareholder wealth maximization. See David P. Porter, Institutional Investors and
Their Role in Corporate Governance: Reflections by a 'Recovering" Corporate Governance
Lawyer, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 627, 639-45 (2009).
92. E-mail from Ronald J. Coffey, Professor of Law Emeritus, Case W. Reserve Univ.
Sch. of Law, to Juliet P. Kostritsky, Professor of Law, Case W. Reserve Univ. Sch. of Law
(May 27, 2015) (on file with author).
93. Coffey, Firm Opportunities,supra note 21, at 173.

2017]

ONE SIZE DOES NOT FIT ALL

69

agent's duty to maximize value for the firm 94 determine the content of
the performance obligation owed to each stockholder? The answer
depends on the terms of the claims against the global return stream,
which will have a different set of variables (timing, amount, and
uncertainty).
The following sections will address how the justification-based
framework for implying fiduciary duties between the agent and investor
should be applied when there are horizontal conflicts between two types
of investors (preferred and common) under the direction of the board of
directors as agent in two vastly different settings. The first setting is
that of the venture capital context and other preferred stock contexts
where the VCs have significant clout to negotiate contractual
protections. The second context is where preferred stockholders have no
direct bargaining power and there is no underwriter massaging terms
on their behalf and significant barriers to self-protection exist and there
the market price may not account for the weaknesses in contractual
protection. Finally, there will be some contexts involving sophisticated
buyers and publicly traded preferred shares where these buyers lack
the power to negotiate contractual protections and the market can
correctly value the weaknesses of the particular express terms.95
B.

Where PreferredStockholders Have Clout or Context Makes Implied
Protections Unnecessary or Costly

In determining whether there are reasons to supply an implied
term beyond the terms expressly bargained for in the VC context, one
should confront whether adding terms will enhance wealth, given
certain assumptions about reality. The adjudicator should first
determine whether the preferred stockholders have effective clout to
bargain over the terms and whether, even if a contractual protection is
lacking, the preferred stockholder had alternative ways of having
94. In most states the directors are not bound to act in the best interests of the
shareholders but in the best interests of the corporation. See Bratton & Wachter, supra
note 2, at 1822.
95. See Michael L. Hartzmark & H. Nejat Seyhun, Understandingthe Efficiency of the
Market for Preferred Stock, 8 VA. L. & Bus. REV. 149, 164 (2014) (identifying six factors
that determine the price and yield of preferred stock: "[1] [t]he expected rate of return on
long-term, riskless debt ...
; [2] [v]arious covenants, provisions, and restrictions
associated with the particular preferred stock . . . ; [3] [tlhe default risk or the probability
that the company will be unable to satisfy some or all of the preferred stock indenture
requirements . . . ; [4] [t]he likely recovery rate of the preferred stock in the case of
bankruptcy or liquidation given current and expected future economic conditions; [5] [t]ax
considerations . .. ; and [6] [1]iquidity risks or likelihood of being able to sell the preferred
stock in a liquid market").
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control over the board. Finally, the adjudicator should resolve interinvestor conflicts in the VC context using a firm wealth-maximizing
perspective. There, whether an agent should be prevented from shifting
wealth from one class of claimants to another should depend on the
ultimacy of the agent's duty to advance the best interests of the firm.
For protections beyond the law-supplied fiduciary obligations, the
default rule in corporate law is that the preferred stockholder must
negotiate through express contracts so omissions are likely to be
deliberate.9 6 Is there a reason that preferred stockholders would not
have arranged to maximize wealth while minimizing transaction costs
because of bargaining impediments? In determining whether or not a
term was omitted by the preferred due to bargaining impediments, one
must take account of the preferred stockholders' ability to consider
negative court decisions. Presumably, if the preferred want to
counteract adverse court decisions, many such preferred stockholders
have the knowledge and clout to know what provisions to add. There is
little need to add a term by law when parties can contract around
negative court decisions.
In the context of preferred shares, the ability to bargain over the
terms of the PSA-the CRPL's-may vary across contexts. In some
instances, as when preferred buy shares in the secondary market, there
may be no opportunity for the preferred to bargain. In other contexts,
such as venture capital, preferred stockholders may have a greater
opportunity to bargain over terms. The preferred stockholders are
generally more monolithic and less diverse a group than common
stockholders and are thus able to negotiate effectively for their
interests. This would be true for VCs, but it would also be true for
privately placed financing by a single purchaser who buys preferred
stock. Such purchases occur where a large publicly traded company
finds it needs a lot of cash to fend off a takeover and issues preferred
shares on financial terms that are attractive to the single purchaser.97
96. In some settings, of course, the obstacles to express contracting may be greater, as
when the preferred buy in the secondary market. In that context, they are not negotiating
for contractual protections since they have already been negotiated. Interview with M&A
Lawyer, supra note 20; see also Virginia B. Morris, Little Common About Preferred Stock,
BETTERINVESTING (last visited Apr. 1, 2018), http://www.betterinvesting.org/public/
(discussing right to sell
startlearning/bi+mag/articles+archives/0908abpublic.htm
preferred stock in the secondary market).
97. Interview with M&A Lawyer, supra note 20; see also Sean Ross, How Can a
Company Resis a Hostile Takeover?, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/
articles/investing/041913/warding-hostile-takeovers.asp (last updated Mar. 22, 2018). One
such example involved Diamond Shamrock's decision to conduct a huge buyback of
common stock to fend off a takeover by T. Boone Pickens. The company needed cash and
issued preferred shares to a single investor. Douglas Martin, Shamrock and Sigmor in
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Because the company needs a cash infusion, the preferred has clout ex
ante. In such cases, there should be little concern that the
investor/preferred shareholder will not secure appropriate protection.
The contract will typically not provide the preferred shareholder with
voting power. However, the investor in such situations is typically not
looking for voting power, but for a stable monetary return.
Similarly, there is little reason to be concerned with the protections
offered to the preferred stockholders when they buy into a financing
preferred arrangement. There, a late stage company sells preferred
shares to raise capital through either a private placement or a public
offering.9 8 Although the investor/preferred shareholder does not
participate directly, the private placement agent or the underwriter
negotiates contractual protections for the preferred shareholder.99
There are still other contexts in which, although the preferred
stockholders do not have great leverage to negotiate over the dividend
rate or other protective provisions (covenants, preferences), there is
little need for those contractual protections, so a judicial rule of implied
protections would not be cost-minimizing. This would be the case, for
example, where a large public utility issues preferred stock in a publicly
underwritten transaction. The terms would likely be standardized in
the marketplace (that is, one utility's preferred looks like any other
utility's preferred issued at the same time) and the preferred would
likely be unable to negotiate special terms. However, because the utility
has a huge asset base and a fairly steady stream of revenue, the
covenant package is slender and the absence of protective covenants
would and should not be a basis for implying additional terms; such
additions would likely be costly. 00 The preferred investors in that
context are making a lower risk investment. If protections were implied

$160 Million Merger, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 1982), http://www.nytimes.com/1982/07/08/
business/shamrock-and-sigmor-in-160-million-merger.html. The investor buying preferred
shares is not looking for control but will secure financial terms it cares about, such as a
class vote on articles amendments pertaining to the preferred.
98.

See JANET KIHOLM SMITH

ET AL.,

ENTREPRENEURIAL

FINANCE:

STRATEGY,

VALUATION, AND DEAL STRUCTURE 53-54 (2011) (discussing private placements of
convertible preferred stock and its advantages over a public offering). Financing preferred
is often issued in a leveraged buyout, as part of financing for an acquisition, and is
sometimes issued to refinance debt or to make major capital investments like a power
plant.
99. See Paul A. Gompers, Optimal Investment, Monitoring, and the Staging of Venture
Capital, 50 J. FIN. 1461, 1461 (1995) (discussing staged financing as a means of
controlling agency costs). The only constraint might be the placement agent's customer
relations with some preferred stockholders. Of course, in large private company offerings
of preferred stock, the placement agent is obtained by the issuer/the company.
100. Interview with M&A Lawyer, supra note 20.
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on behalf of the preferred who took a low risk investment, the result
would add to transaction costs as future parties would recontract
around the outcome. It is only higher risk issuers who need to offer
investors more protective provisions. Adding protections would increase
the burdens on the low risk utility and rearrange the risk allocation
between the parties. Future utilities might have to offer lower rates to
investors since they would be saddled with additional burdens.1 01
In resolving the key question of intervention beyond the contract,
one must look beyond the bargaining power issues. If the preferred have
bargaining power, the absence of protective terms may be a deliberate
choice. Even in cases where the preferred lack bargaining power to
extract protection, to determine whether legal intervention would be
value maximizing, one should determine if there are other private
strategies beyond contract that offer alternative protection at a lower
cost. One of the private mechanisms that may work as a protective
mechanism when the parties lack the clout or foresight to bargain for
express provisions is the traditional diversification strategy of making
many small investments, expecting at least some to pay off, while many
others will lose or at best break even.1 02 For some early round investors
(angels or some VCs), the preferred may adopt a mixed investment
policy, partly driven by economic value and a desire for their own
wealth but partly also eleemosynary as part of an effort to grow the
greater economy.103 This differentiation can affect the terms negotiated
with an issuer and might affect the willingness of a court to imply
protective terms since the investors may consider themselves better off
even when their investments fail.
Another private strategy would be relying on the market itself. The
market would discount preferred stock whose contractual protections
were weak, signaling caution to buyers of preferred stock.1 04 For
publicly traded shares, one would need to ascribe to the efficient market
theory proposition that the current trading price works and correctly
values the weakness of the particular express terms (including having
the foresight to correctly price future changes in circumstances that
undermine the preferred shares). Another strategy that some preferred
101. Id.
102. Preferred stockholders commonly use this strategy. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 5, at
257.
103. Interview with M&A Lawyer, supra note 20.
104. For example, in considering whether to mandate a rule prohibiting brokers from
recommending stocks that they have not personally investigated, parties might prefer a
court not to add such a term since it "raises the price the broker will charge and
diminishes the investor's benefit from the transaction." Contract and Fiduciary Duty,
supranote 27, at 428.
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use is staged financing.105 Venture capitalists often arrange the
financing so that if the entrepreneur is not performing or is diverting
assets for his private benefit, the venture capitalist can simply withhold
financing at the next successive entry point.106 In addition, the venture
capitalist can arrange for board control or voting control, other private
strategies that act as a means of protecting the preferred's interests.
Finally, in deciding whether to imply a non-negotiated protection
for the preferred in the VC or other context, the adjudicator must
account for the conflict as a principal-agent problem. 07
Investors are principals who have furnished resources to a
designated agent who then makes decisions about how to manage a pool
of assets for a firm. 08 The principal-agent aspect of these horizontal
conflicts has been neglected. That neglect makes it harder to resolve
horizontal conflicts between preferred and common stockholders given
the agent's responsibilities.
The key insight from financial economics is that an agent's decision
can produce different and even negative reverberative effects on
different claimants (one class may benefit and another class may be
harmed by the agent's actions) without resulting in any sacrifice to the
asset pool.10 9 Moreover, if the claimants can anticipate that the firm's
agent will shift wealth to maximize the value of the firm, there should
be no need to protect an adversely affected claimant who could
negotiate contractual protections or rely on other means such as board
control or staged financing.
If firms shift wealth in this way under wealth-maximizing
principles,11 0 one must address whether there is a reason to prevent the
105. See generally Gompers, supranote 99.
106. See id. at 1463-67 (discussing staged financing as a means of controlling agency
costs).
107. For a discussion of the incentive problems in principal-agent relationships, see
Sappington, supra note 34. Sappington's article usefully examines "the sources of friction
between principal and agent that typically preclude this ideal arrangement." Id. at 46.
108. When an agent accepts that position of having control over the assets of the firm,
it is truly an agent in the economic sense. See Cooter & Freedman, supra note 68, at
1050-51; supra Figure 1 and note 86.
109. Coffey, Firm Opportunities,supra note 21. As Professor Coffey explains:
The strategies by which wealth shifts in favor of shareholders can be
implemented are quite varied, but all achieve their effects by changing the
marketable-value-significant risk (called systemic risk) and expected-return
features of stock in a favorable direction, while simultaneously moving the same
attributes of debt in an unfavorable direction.
Id. at 173.
110. "If we assume rationality, then it follows that, regardless of the risk attitudes of
particular parties, the dominant strategy for contractual risk allocation is to maximize the
expected value of the contract for both parties." Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of
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board of directors, as the agent, from shifting wealth, and if so, under
what circumstances. The ultimacy of the director's obligation under
most state statutes-to advance the best interests of the corporationmust also be addressed."' Further questions include whether a lawsupplied rule should prevent such wealth shifting that advantages one
claimant at the expense of another, and why and when that rule would
be supplied, and what the costs of such a rule would be.
Crafting a rule preventing wealth shifting would introduce
substantial costs. First, it would put the manager in an untenable
position of having no way "to make tradeoffs between" the two
competing claimants.1 12 Second, this rule would create uncertainty for
the manager tasked with making a decision.113 A third cost would be
the manager's inability to decide in cases whenever one class of
claimants is adversely affected, possibly leading to a standstill for the
company. Resolving these issues may depend on the particular state
statute governing the purpose of a for-profit corporation and on the
articulation of the director's duties. Are they phrased in terms of
advancing the best interests of the corporation 1 4 or of advancing the
interests of a particular class of claimants?11 5
Recognizing the inevitable wealth shifting 16 that can occur as
agents manage assets under conditions of uncertainty and the possible
mismatch in risk preferences between different classes of investors
should help determine what strategy the agent of the claimants should
pursue as well as the limits that should be imposed on such choices. In
making these determinations, one should recognize that, to the extent

Default Rules for Commercial Contracts, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 597, 602 (1990); see also
WILLIAMSON, supra note 10, at 63 (recognizing the parties' '"ong-term interest in effecting
adaptations of a joint profit-maximizing kind").
111. See, for example, section 1701.59 of the Ohio Code and section 8.30 of the MBCA.
The MBCA provides in the Standards of Conduct for Directors that: "(a) Each member of
the board of directors, when discharging the duties of a director shall act: (1) in good faith,
and (2) in a manner the director reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the
corporation." MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT. § 8.30(a) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2005); see also OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 1701.59 (LexisNexis 2009) (Supp. 2014).
112. Jensen, supra note 11, at 237.
113. Id.
114. See Strine, supra note 78, at 2028.
115. The general linguistic gloss in the case law urging the board to favor the common,
thus furnishing an example of protecting a particular class of claimants, goes back to the
duty of the agent to foster the long term value maximization of the firm since the
interests of the common stock are generally more aligned with that goal because of the
risk/return reward with common stock.
116. One such suggestion to prevent wealth shifting would be a covenant that "would
simply prohibit a corporation from acting in a way that reduces the value of the preferred
stock." See McEllin, supra note 5, at 924.
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that wealth shifting is anticipated, parties can prevent it by contract or
can protect themselves through a discounted initial purchase price.117
Thus, in the context of VCs, where everything is thought out and
anticipated, there may be little reason to imply terms protecting the
preferred beyond the contractual protections negotiated. This is
especially true since there are costs to the firm of preventing wealth
shifting between the common and the preferred, and the wealth shifting
possibility is factored into the price of the stock or prevented by
contract. In other contexts, where the preferred lack the ability to
negotiate directly over terms or there is no market price discount for
lack of protective provisions, a different response to the legal
intervention beyond the terms of the contract might be more
justifiable. 118
C.

Venture Capital Cases
1.

Trados

An important case involving conflict between the preferred and the
common was In re Trados Inc. Shareholder Litigation.119 The first
question in reviewing any board action is whether the board owed a
duty to the common stockholders. If yes, the second question is what
standard of review should apply when reviewing the breach of fiduciary
duty claim. In Trados, the court found that the directors "have the legal
responsibility to manage the business of a corporation for the benefit of
its shareholder[
owners," 120 including the plaintiff common
stockholders. Then, because the plaintiff proved a conflict of interest 21
under the governing duty of loyalty owed by the board, the court held
that the business judgment rule did not apply and instead applied the

117. See Coffey, Firm Opportunities, supra note 21, at 173. For example, bondholders
anticipate that shareholders will take actions that benefit themselves at the expense of
bondholders and sometimes at the expense of the firm. Bondholders seek to control such
behavior by various indenture provisions, and evidence suggests that such indenture
controls raise the value of the firm. See Clifford W. Smith, Jr. & Jerold B. Warner, On
Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants, 7 J. FIN. ECON. 117, 118-24
(1979).
118. See supra Section IV.B.
119. 73 A.3d 17 (Del. Ch. 2013).
120. Id. at 48 n.3, 36 (quoting N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v.
Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 99 (Del. 2007)).
121. Id. at 47. For a discussion on conflicts of interest, see supra Section 1V.A.
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burden of proving the entire fairness of the transaction-the most
rigorous standard of review-to the defendant.122
The court articulated a two-part test for fairness: fairness of the
process and fairness of the price. 123 The court found significant flaws in
the process, including the failure to consider any possible conflict
between the preferred and the common. 124 However, under an entire
fairness review, the court found that because the defendant proved a
fair price, the process flaws by themselves did not warrant a finding of a
breach of fiduciary duty. 125 Based on a comparison of the value of the
common stock before and after the merger-both had a value of zero
dollars-the fairness standard was easily satisfied.1 26
In its fairness scrutiny, the court looked at the kinds of tradeoffs the
board must make to determine whether a particular strategy should be
pursued. 127 The court affirmed the Orban test of proving fairness where
"there was no future for the business and no better alternative for the
unit holders."1 28
a.

Criticisms of Trados: Lack of FiduciaryProtectionfor
Preferredas Preferred

Critics of Trados bemoan the decision on several grounds. The first
set of criticisms aims at the lack of fiduciary protection for the preferred
and the relegation of the preferred to their contractual rights. 129 Other
critics argue it was a mistake for the Trados court to find that the
preferred in control had a fiduciary duty to "consider the best interests
of the common stockholders in making decisions." 130 These critics argue
that if the preferred want to sell the company, they need to pay

&

122. Trados, 73 A.3d at 42-46. Under this standard, "Delaware law requires that the
interested party prove that the transaction was entirely fair to the corporation, in the
sense that it was on terms as favorable as could have been achieved in an arms-length
deal subject to market competition." Strine et al., supra note 28, at 643.
123. Trados, 73 A.3d at 44, 66.
124. Id. at 63-65.
125. Id. at 66, 78; see also id. at 76 n.48 (citing Orban v. Field, No. 12820, 1997 WL
153831, at *1-9 (Del. Ch. Apr. 1, 1997)) (discussing the ability of the board to promote the
interest of one class of shareholders at the expense of another class of shareholders as
long as it is in the corporation's best interests).
126. Id. at 77.
127. See id. at 76.
128. Id. at 76 & n.48 (first quoting Blackmore Partners v. Link Energy LLC, 864 A.2d
80, 86 (Del. Ch. 2004); and then citing Orban, 1997 WL 153831, at *1-9).
129. Bratton and Wachter criticize the fact that the law does not recognize a fiduciary
obligation to the preferred "because [the preferred's rights] are contractual." Bratton
Wachter, supranote 2, at 1884.
130. Strine, supra note 78, at 2040.
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attention only to "whether the sale was at fair market value"13 1 and
should not owe a duty to maximize common stock value or to consider
common stockholder interest. Under these views, the Trados court
improperly handed "the entrepreneur [common stockholder] a fiduciary
backstop" which overcame the deal's risk allocation.1 32 Invoking a noncontractual expectation, critics argued that that the preferred should
not have to wait patiently for the company's prospects to pan out' 33 but
should be able to cash out without considering the common stockholder,
even in cases where the preferred did not secure a contractual
protection to force a liquidation.1 34
In deciding whether the preferred in Trados should be able to force
a sale that they did not bargain for as a contractual right, thus
garnering extra-contractual protection beyond the fiduciary protection
offered to all stockholders and beyond the contractual protections
actually negotiated by the preferred, one should use a three-pronged
analysis. First, one should ask whether there are substantial
impediments to bargaining that interfere with the preferred's
achievement of their goals. This will rarely be the case in the VC
context. Second, regardless of any impediments, would a law-supplied
rule to protect the preferred be cost-justified and promote value
maximization? Third, how does the principal-agent analysis help?
The first prong asks: is there a total cost minimizing or wealth
enhancing reason to imply additional protections for the preferred? One
would first address whether the preferred could have protected
themselves. Were they beset by the types of collective action problems
that beset common stockholders? If not, there may be little reason to
supply a default rule.
We will assume that most, but not all, preferred stockholders have
the clout to protect themselves. Moreover, because legislatures provide
that preferred stock gets additional protections-rights, preferences,
and limitations-only if expressly bargained for, the parties know that
they need to bargain for extra-contract protection.
The second prong asks: even if they lack that clout, does the price at
which the stock trades reflect the degree of protection offered by the
contract? If so, that would argue against further protecting preferred
bought at a discount due to the lack of protective provisions. 35 Thus,
unless the market does not accurately reflect the degree of protection

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id. at 2027.
Bratton & Wachter, supra note 2, at 1885.
See id. at 1904-05.
See id. at 1889-90.
See discussion supra notes 2-4.
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for particular preferred, there is no reason to allow the preferred to
ignore the effect on the common because doing so would ignore the
initial bargain and force re-contracting in future deals.
Therefore, lack of bargaining clout itself would not resolve whether
additional protection should be implied. One would need to know
whether the market accurately reflected the lack of protective
provisions for the preferred. Moreover, protection can exist even
without legal protection due to structural protections such as board
control and staged financing negotiated by preferred.
The third prong asks whether adding protection for the preferred
under which the board would have a fiduciary duty to the preferred
beyond any stipulated contractual terms and beyond the fiduciary
duties owed to all stockholders-such as not to commit waste or divert
assets-would ignore the nature of the agent's responsibility to act for
all principals to manage assets for the firm. Recognizing a noncontractual duty to the preferred as preferred would not be helpful in
achieving the ultimate goal of maximizing value for the firm and thus
should not be adopted for that reason. There is no reason that adopting
it would do any more than offset the costs of its adoption. The essence of
an agent acting for dual principals is to take actions in the best
interests of the corporation and not to maximize the value for one set of
claimants while ignoring another set of claimants or the effect on the
value of the firm. 13 6 Restraining the board's discretion and carving out a
duty to the preferred would run counter to the view that agents should
be able to take actions that harm one set of claimants when such
actions are in the interest of the corporation. Further, this duty to the
preferred would unduly hamper the board, forcing it into a
straightjacket. Creating a judicially supplied rule to protect the
preferred as preferred would divide up the agent's responsibilities and
give one class of claimants-the preferred-the ability to restrain any
action of the board because it was not in the interest of a single
claimant. Courts are comfortable supplying a performance obligation of
the agent because doing so controls an endemic risk that is inevitable
given the separation of ownership and control. This separation is

136. See Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A.2d 584, 593-95 (Del. Ch. 1986).
The judicial formulations of fiduciary duty often emphasize the need to act for maximizing
common stock shareholder wealth as a linguistic shorthand for what will best serve the
interests of the firm since the risk/return for the common stock will generally yield the
highest return for the firm. The common stockholder is being used to depict the risk/
return profile that will yield the highest value. The common stock is not being favored as
a single claimant when its interests would diverge from those of the firm. See, e.g., Strine
et al., supra note 28, at 631-34 (discussing this concept as applied in Delaware corporate
law).
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omnipresent but difficult and costly to control by contract; courts
intervene because they are convinced that the parties would have
bargained for the fiduciary obligation were it not for transaction costs.
In Trados, had the court allowed the board to ignore the deal's effect
on the common by carving out extra-contractual protection or a quasifiduciary duty to the preferred that would have allowed it to exit, it
would have ignored the fact that dual principals had both furnished
assets to the agent. By endorsing the proposition that "the board owes
no fiduciary duty to maximize the value of the preferred," the Trados
court was implicitly underlining that an agent's duty is to manage the
assets for the firm as a whole. 137 Implying a fiduciary duty of the agent
to generate value for the firm is consistent with the principal-agent
model described above. However, allowing the preferred to prevail and
gain a judicial right to exit would ignore the fact that the agent's duty is
to the firm itself, not to any claimant-preferred or otherwise. The costs
imposed on a board from a rule permitting it to ignore the common to
secure a right not bargained for by the preferred would include a
disinclination for the common to furnish assets to such agents. That
would not be value maximizing for the firm.
Ignoring the effects on the common would overlook the basic
premise that the principal-here the preferred-sought a type of claim
that matched its preferences, endowments, and beliefs, and that the
terms negotiated did not include a right to a forced liquidation.
Therefore, if the court were to allow the preferred to force liquidation
without considering the effect on the common, it would be overriding
the basic risk/return profile of the initial investment whose terms the
preferred plaintiffs negotiated.
The Trados court, while affirming the principle of common stock
maximization, actually analyzed the board's role in a way that reflects
the thesis of this Article that, in deciding conflicts between investors
who might have conflicting interests, the court should consider the
board an agent with two furnishers of resources and two claimants on
the pool of assets managed by the agent/board of directors. Although
recognizing that "it is possible that a director could breach her duty by
improperly favoring the interests of the preferred stockholders over
those of the common stockholders,"1 3 8 at the same time, the court gave
the board latitude to make tradeoffs in the best interests of the
corporation despite the adverse effects on a single class of claimants,
137. Strine, supra note 78, at 2028; see also In re Trados Inc. S'holder Litig., 73 A.3d
17, 36-41 (Del. Ch. 2013).
138. Trados, 73 A.3d at 41-42 (emphasis omitted) (quoting In re Trados Inc. S'holder
Litig., No. 1512-CC, 2009 WL 2225958, at *7 (Del. Ch. July 24, 2009)).
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including the common stockholders. This is clear from both the Trados
result itself, validating a decision that wiped out the option value for
the common stockholders, and from the Trados court's approval of the
Orban case,' 39 which involved a similar destruction of value for the
common stockholders.1 40
The court recognized the directors' need to "exercise their
independent fiduciary judgment" rather than "cater to stockholder
whim."141 Under this standard, the board is afforded the discretion to

determine whether the common's hope for a future is realistic or not. In
upholding the board's right to determine the company's lifespan as an
independent entity and to decide on an appropriate time to pursue a
merger, the court was validating the right of the agent overseeing a pool
of assets to determine the value of waiting and to decide when waiting
no longer makes sense.1 42 Managers of company assets are constantly
making these tradeoffs, determining whether to invest now or to take
an option on waiting to develop the project until more uncertainties are
resolved. Although a board must consider the effect on the common, it
will not be found in breach merely because one claimant, a common
stockholder, wanted to preserve the option of waiting and did not want
a merger or exit.
This opinion upholds the board's right as an agent managing a
single pool of assets to manage the pool as it deems reasonable. The
Trados court's affirmation of the Equity-Linked principle that "[t]hey
[the board] have every right to send no good dollars after bad ones" 143
recognizes that the timing of investment and exit decisions are
complicated decisions that boards have to make. The court in Trados, in
tracing the board's decision on why the continuation would yield no
return for the common, gave latitude to the board and rejected the
plaintiffs central argument that the board must keep the company
alive if that was what the common stockholders wanted. 144

139. Id. at 38, 42, 76 n.48.
140. Id. at 76 n.48 (citing Orban v. Field, No. 12820, 1997 WL 153831, at *1-9 (Del.
Ch. Apr. 1, 1997)).
141. Id. at 38 (citing Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1154
(Del. 1989)).
142. See supra note 24 and discussion in Dodge comparing alternative present values.
143. Trados, 73 A.3d at 77 (quoting Equity-Linked Inv'rs, L.P. v. Adams, 705 A.2d
1040, 1057 (Del. Ch. 1997)).
144. See id. at 76-78.
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Negative Effect on CorporateValue? None Where
ContractualProtectionsCan Be Negotiated by the Preferred

Two critics, Professors Bratton and Wachter, have voiced concern
that the common stock maximization principle endorsed by Trados can
make a corporation "less valuable" and result in "perverse
incentives." 145 Bratton and Wachter were also concerned that the case
"imposes potential fiduciary liability on directors who pursue enterprise
146
value over suboptimal speculation for the common's benefit."
But if Trados is read properly, and if the principal-agent model and
the vaulting question of determining implied duties based on whether
adding them will achieve benefits that exceed costs are addressed in the
case analysis, one can see that Trados does not propose that the board
must sacrifice enterprise value for the common. As Chancellor Strine
suggests, Trados stands for the proposition "that a traditional duty of
loyalty toward the interest of the common must be observed and that a
preferred controller cannot disregard the best interests of the common
147
in its effort to exit its investment."
If the preferred were not in control as in Trados, and the board
decided that the best interests of the firm required that the interest of
the common be wiped out, one might think that the board would have
that discretion. No one, not even common stockholders, would want a
rule preventing certain corporate decisions that wipe out the common's
interest but are in the best interests of the firm. Common shareholders
might appear to benefit from such a rule, but that kind of rule could
make it harder for the firm to access financing from banks, debt, and
preferred stock, which harms common stockholders and the firm as a
whole. The board is generally under a "duty to pursue business
strategies benefiting the common stockholders" 148 but, at a certain
point, that strategy makes no business sense and the interests of the
firm will be best served by declaring bankruptcy. Consistent with its
duties to the common, "[a] board may certainly deploy corporate power
against its own shareholders [the common] in some circumstances-the
greater good justifying the action-but when it does, it should be
required to demonstrate that it acted both in good faith and
reasonably." 149 Thus, the duty toward the common does not trump the

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Bratton & Wachter, supra note 2, at 1885-86.
Id. at 1887.
Strine, supra note 78, at 2039.
Id. at 2040.
Orban v. Field, No. 12820, 1997 WL 153831, at *8 (Del. Ch. Apr. 1, 1997).
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duty toward the firm and it should not prevent a merger that is in the
best interests of the firm.
If the role of the board is traced back to the principal-agent model
with dual furnishers of resources, the board's role is one of making
constant tradeoffs between long-term and short-term gains and making
choices that will not be wealth sacrificing but will all fall on a line of
non-wealth sacrificing choices, each of which will have a different risk
and return profile. If this is the case, then the Trados case, even with
its emphasis on common stockholder wealth maximization, seems to be
wealth enhancing rather than "ex ante value destroying."15 0
The example given by Bratton and Wachter in which the Trados
common stock maximization principle will result in a sacrifice of
enterprise value involves a company that has received a $60 million
offer. 15 1 In their hypothetical, "the venture capitalist's liquidation
preference is $40 million."15 2 They envision two scenarios: one with an
upside and one with a downside. If the board waits, there is a 25%
chance of getting a better offer of $70 million but a 75% chance of
receiving a worse $50 million offer. "The expected value of delay [cost] is
$55 million ($70 million x [25%] + $50 million x [75%])," and Bratton
and Wachter think that Trados scrutiny would cause a board to
misallocate resources to the common because it would prompt the board
to reject the current $60 million offer and pick the delay option, since
that is the only scenario under which the common will have any value.
Delay would cost the enterprise $5 million. 153 Under their view, the
common stock maximization principle will cause the board to pick the
option that favors the common (25% of $3 million or $750,000), and that
is the delay strategy since under the other option, cashing out now for
$60 million will leave the common $0.154
This example seems fraught with difficulties. First, the board would
have to compare whether potentially gaining $750,000 would be worth
the potential loss of waiting to the common. There is a 75% chance of
the company receiving a worse offer of $50 million under which the
common would receive nothing. Bratton and Wachter seem to think
that if there is any chance of the common receiving any value, then the
board must take that option.15 5 This does not seem compelled by Trados
or by conceptions of the role of the agent to consider tradeoffs and weigh
150. Walther, supra note 80, at 192; see also Bratton & Wachter, supra note 2, at 1886.
151. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 2, at 1886.
152. Id.
153. Id. ("Delay thus sacrifices $5 million of enterprise value in exchange for a chance
to realize an expected $750,000 ($3 million x [25%]) for the common.").
154. Id. at 1883.
155. Id. at 1886.

2017]

ONE SIZE DOES NOT FIT ALL

83

options, taking into account the risk and targeted return of the investor,
the value of waiting, the uncertainty, other possible options to delay
taking action now, and comparing present values of alternative future
return stream strategies.
Second, if the preferred had secured a liquidation value as well as a
contractual right to compel a sale at the liquidation value, then there
would be no sacrifice of enterprise value.156 The preferred could compel
the company to sell, and there would be no delay and no loss of $5
million in value. However, since the preferred lacked any contractual
right to compel a sale and payment of the liquidation value, there would
be no sacrifice of enterprise value as outlined by Bratton and
Wachter. 15 7 The pricing of the preferred stock would be discounted to
reflect the fact that the preferred lacked a right to compel a sale, and
the potential loss in enterprise value would be priced ex ante.
Moreover, the concerns over Trados seem overblown given the
concept of an agent for many classes of claimants with decisions being
made all the time that are value-neutral in terms of the asset pool but
that have a reverberative effect on one class of claimants. The board
may have a certain offer of $60 million now, but the timeline of both the
preferred and the common is perpetuity and the calculations of the cost
of waiting or delay might change over time. The value of waiting might
increase. There might be a 25% chance of an offer of $70 million in the
near term and a 75% chance of $50 million in the near term, but there
might be other offers if the board waits an additional amount of time. In
addition, the board might be able in this situation to take an option for
the $60 million deal rather than an option of delay. It might not take
the $60 million deal right now but might acquire an option on that deal.
It could exercise the option depending on how the uncertainties
resolved. If the board was convinced that the delay, even with the 25%
chance of $3 million, 15 8 would result in a negative effect on the asset
pool as a whole, perhaps because the waiting would reflect negatively
on perceptions of the company's worth (a signal), and if the board
decided that the best option of all the alternatives was to sell now to
avoid those negative effects, presumably the board could choose the $60
million offer without liability.
Finally, the board might choose the delay even with a projected loss
of $5 million because of non-monetary returns which might lead to an
overall greater value for the common than the $750,000 figure
156. See Strine, supra note 78, at 2029-30 (discussing protection offered through
liquidation provisions); see also Bratton & Wachter, supra note 2, at 1882-85.
157. Bratton & Wachter, supranote 2, at 1847.
158. See supra note 153-54 and accompanying text.
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represents. It might decide that those non-monetary returns include the
value of keeping the entity alive. Just as a single investor without an
agent can make tradeoffs including non-monetary returns that would
otherwise seem like an irrational sacrifice of dollar returns, so too can
the agent acting for dual investors take non-monetary returns into
account in reaching a rational or optimal decision for the company.
The board must be able to decide whether cashing out at $60
million now is the right course of action for a company with a perpetual
existence. If an independent board not subject to a conflict of interest
decided to cash out, would the common have been able to complain,
alleging that the board must always take steps to sabotage the
preferred? Probably not-instead, the court would likely defer to the
board's ability to determine the timeline for liquidating the company
rather than second-guessing it.
Cost minimization/wealth maximization also suggests that the
Trados result is correct.15 9 Had the court adopted the view that the
preferred should be able to exit without considering the effect on the
common and be able to do so whenever it is advantageous, the court
would be bestowing a gift that the preferred did not bargain for. This
would immediately have negative effects on other shareholders that
must be accounted for in any cost/benefit analysis of the legal
intervention.
Finally, protecting the preferred through a rule allowing the
preferred to exit whenever it is advantageous could have negative
effects on the capital markets. It could potentially negatively affect the
ability of issuers to raise capital, since investors would no longer have
any confidence that agents would consider the effect on different classes
of investors and the firm.
2.

Thought Works: Calculating the Wealth Effects

Cases involving preferred stock that pose the question of whether to
offer judicial protection beyond the contractually negotiated terms
should be assessed in two ways: (1) using the framework of the agent
(the board) acting for multiple principals (classes of investors) in the
best interests of the corporation and to maximize the value of the
equity, and (2) asking the key question of whether judicial intervention
of a particular type would gain more than it costs.

159.

See supra Section IV.C.1.a.
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Without that framework, critics become too easily convinced that
the case illustrates the bias against preferred stockholders. 160 Bratton
and Wachter criticize the court for "stripping away a promise's
contractual vitality by remitting the decision to perform the promise to
pay to the discretion of the issuer's board."16 1
With the framework outlined here, the board of directors must
manage a corporation with a perpetual existence in the best interests of
the corporation, even if a particular action adversely impacts a
particular class of investors at a particular time.
In SV Investment Partners, LLC v. ThoughtWorks, Inc.,1 62 the
preferred wanted to force a redemption of its preferred stock.163 The
board was willing to engage in periodic small redemptions of preferred
stock but refused the large redemption of preferred stock on the ground
that the company lacked the necessary cash to meet the requirement of
legally available funds.1 64 The preferred challenged that refusal,
arguing that the certificate of incorporation's language entitled the
preferred to a mandatory redemption since the preferred investor could
"require [the company] to redeem for cash out of any funds legally
available therefor."1 65 Mandatory redemption provisions of this kind are
one of the protective provisions preferred stockholders put in their
preferred stock contracts as a kind of "downside protection for the VCs
as a way to salvage the remains of an unsuccessful investment."1 66
The Thought Works court consulted both the Delaware statute and
the certificate of incorporation. Title 8, section 160 of the Delaware
Code provides: "Every corporation may purchase, redeem, receive, take
or otherwise acquire . . . its own shares . . . ."167 That permissive right to
redeem shares, however, is subject to restrictions that make the
redemption contingent on the action not impairing the capital of the
corporation. The Delaware statutory restrictions on redemptions
constituted a creditor protection against the extreme moral hazard of a
corporation redeeming all of its stock, leaving no capital at all to pay its
debt.16

160. See Strine, supranote 78, at 2030 n.22 (citing Bratton & Wachter, supranote 2, at
1868) (explaining that Bratton and Wachter see the use of the "corporate paradigm" to the
exclusion of contract analysis as exhibiting such bias).
161. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 2, at 1860.
162. 7 A.3d 973 (Del. Ch. 2010), aff'd, 37 A.3d 205 (Del. 2011).
163. Id. at 978-80.
164. Id. at 979-80.
165. Id. at 982.
166. Korsmo, supra note 7, at 1179.
167. ThoughtWorks, 7 A.3d at 981 (quoting DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 160(a) (2010)).
168. See id. at 982.
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The preferred stockholders argued that because the company had a
"surplus," the redemption in the certificate of incorporation was
mandatory since it provided them "the right to have their stock
69
redeemed 'for cash out of any funds legally available therefor."'1
However, the court interpreted that language differently from the
preferred stockholders. First, it found that the term "funds legally
available" meant a realistic "available source of cash" rather than an
accounting finding of a surplus.1 70 Second, it pointed to a panoply of
judicial doctrines that constrain "a corporation's ability to use funds,
rendering them not 'legally available."' 171 These doctrines prevent a
corporation from executing stock redemptions where the effect would be
to cause insolvency. Looking at these strictures, the court found that
the board was within its rights to refuse the redemption of the preferred
despite the language apparently mandating redemption.1 72
Preferred stock exists within the larger framework of both
contractual rights owed to the preferred and the corporate context of
the board of directors acting as an agent for multiple classes of
investors. If one focuses only on the contract and the contract language,
one might criticize Thought Works for narrowly interpreting the
language to "hurt" the preferred.1 78 But the preferred invested in, and
furnished resources to, an agent who is committed to the best interests
of the corporation. Moreover, once the value is furnished to the firm by
the preferred investor, the asset is no longer his. The preferred investor
knows that resources from other investors with different risk and
return profiles will be furnished and also knows that its agent, the
board, is given plenary discretionary decision making with respect to
the operation of the firm's assets and financial matters. The preferred is
halfway between common equity, which has a high risk and high

169. Id. at 976.
170. Id. at 984.
171. Id. at 985.
172. Id. at 989-90 ("The Board's process has been impeccable, and the Board has acted
responsibly to fulfill its contractual commitment to the holders of the Preferred Stock
despite other compelling business uses for the Company's cash. This is not a case where
the Board has had ample cash available for redemptions and simply chose to pursue a
contrary course.").
173. See, e.g., Bratton & Wachter, supra note 2, at 1860 (stating that Thought Works
"radically expanded the zone of enforcement constraint, stripping away a promise's
contractual vitality by remitting the decision to perform the promise to pay to the
discretion of the issuer's board"). Bratton and Wachter also argue that the denial of
redemption rights to the preferred would "disable[ a productive mode of financing." Id. at
1874. That result would only occur if venture capitalists were unable to arrange matters
to protect themselves through contract or other means-board control, voting control,
staged financing, etc.
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return, and debt, which has a low risk but low return. If that role is
understood, then the board of directors must manage a corporation with
a perpetual existence in the best interests of the corporation, even if a
particular action adversely impacts a particular class of investors at a
particular time. Debtholders and preferred stockholders know and
anticipate that there will be these kinds of wealth effects or transfers
when they buy the stock or make the loan. Similarly, the preferred have
chosen to hold yet a different type of claim to match their diverse
preferences, endowments, and beliefs.
When the company started to flounder and attempted to acquire
cash to redeem the preferred failed, the preferred wanted to force a
redemption. 174 However, the preferred failed to build in more protective
provisions to allow them to force an exit, such as a drag along right.175
The board had a duty to act in the best interests of the corporation. In
the context of ThoughtWorks, that might mean that when a company is
subject to volatile cash flows, the board might choose to maintain a cash
cushion if that is critical for the corporation's existence, even if it
interferes with the preferred's ability to exit through redemption,
unless the preferred specifically negotiated for the right to exit on an
unrestricted basis.1 76 In addition, since the board has to act to preserve
the company's ability to borrow in the future, the board should be able
to preserve the cash cushion.1 77 Had the court interpreted the language
"funds legally available" to permit capital impairment, and in effect
gone beyond the language and converted the mandatory redemption
provision that was subject to the qualifying language restricting
redemption to cases where funds were legally available into a provision
that would have forced a liquidation of the firm, the court would have
been ignoring the limiting language and all of the associated case law
"for the board to use in determining when a payment to the preferred is
78
Future creditors might refuse to lend the corporation
required."s
needed cash, fearing that even where the language subjects the
174. Thought Works, 7 A.3d at 978-80.
175. Id. at 991-92.
176. See Korsmo, supra note 7, at 1226-27.
177. Bratton and Wachter would see ThoughtWorks as a case where "the corporate
paradigm trumps the contract paradigm," since they assert that the contract language
was present and sufficient to protect the preferred and the court upended that contractual
protection in favor of allowing the board to decide whether there were funds legally
available to redeem the preferred stock. See Bratton & Wachter, supranote 2, at 1865-74,
1885. However, once the contract protection is fully interpreted as a qualified right to
redeem, the role of the corporate board in deciding on whether sufficient funds existed to
redeem the preferred cannot be seen as trumping the contract, since the contract itself
referenced corporate limits on redemption.
178. Korsmo, supranote 7, at 1227.
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redemption to a condition of having funds legally available, the court
will force a company to redeem anyway, as though the preferred
negotiated for an unqualified mandatory redemption. Even though, ex
post, the preferred want to cash out when the company flounders, ex
ante the preferred would want the board to have the discretion to
determine an adequate cash cushion. Finally, given the nature of the
business, with the major assets of the company tied up in employee
compensation for a service business, rather than tangible assets, the
redemption of the preferred stock would have had disastrous
consequences, eliminating the surplus "even for the purposes of
redeeming the shares."1 79 Thus, a decision depriving the board of its
discretion to resist a redemption when, in the board's judgment, it did
not have the funds needed, would likely have negative wealth effects.
If one applies the agency model to the facts in Thought Works, one
would argue that, as the agent for dual classes of shareholders, the
agent must be able to resist the demands of one class of shareholderssuch as a redemption demand-if that demand would interfere with the
agent's ability to maintain a viable company. The agent must consider
the value-maximizing effect first and never do anything to sacrifice the
value of the global firm, which would not be served by depriving the
company of the ability to operate once redemptions were made to the
preferred.180

On appeal, the court held that the board's determination of whether
funds were legally available is a matter of business judgment.181 In
deciding whether to limit the board's discretion in future deals and
make the decision not a matter of business judgment for the board, and
to force redemption when the board interpreted the language to
preclude redemption, one should consider whether that decision would
be wealth-enhancing or whether the costs would more than offset the
benefits. A decision for the preferred by implying fiduciary protection to
limit the board's discretion would result in an immediate re-contracting
around the results in future deals. Issuers would insist on protection
against judicial rewriting of the certificate of incorporation and
expressly negotiate contracts that define "funds legally available" to be
a matter for the board's business judgment.1 82
In making this decision, the court should consider whether the
preferred's failure to force an exit was a gap or whether, ex ante, the

179. Id. at 1198, 1226-27.
180. Id. at 1183; see also 1 JAMES D. Cox & THOMAs LEE HAZEN, Cox & HAZEN ON
CORPORATIONS § 4.07 (2003).
181. SV Inv. Partners, LLC v. ThoughtWorks, Inc., 37 A.3d 205, 211-12 (2011).
182. Korsmo, supra note 7, at 1228-30.

2017]

ONE SIZE DOES NOT FITALL

89

preferred might have decided that the costs of forcing an exit on the
issuer through a drag along right was not advantageous because of the
other effects it might have had on the deal with the issuer. Thus, the
decision to include the "funds legally available" language was done with
the full knowledge that it left the preferred vulnerable to the board's
discretionary limits. Presumably, the parties negotiating these deals
are doing so in an ex ante cost-minimizing way to maximize the gains
from trade. They are relying on their own estimates of the likelihood of
an IPO, their pricing of the deal and the protective provisions that it
has, the reputational norms that might constrain the board from
opportunistically gouging the preferred, and other factors. The
preferred are also presumably deciding to forego other more protected
investments, such as convertible debt. Additionally, they may forego a
protective provision that gives them the power to force liquidation when
redemption was sought but refused.1 83
The vaulting question of all judicial interventions is whether an
implied judicial term, such as one limiting the board's right to make
determinations about redemption, has greater benefits than costs. The
cost would include the immediate re-contracting costs for parties who do
not want their boards to be restricted in making stock redemption
decisions to consider not only available accounting surplus but also
whether cash is realistically available to fund a redemption. The cost
would also include the immediate hit to other outstanding securities
that would now be subject to the unanticipated and unpriced risks of
capital impairment needed for creditor protection or perhaps for the
future growth of the company.1 84
In cases where there is a wide appreciation of the more protective
devices available to the preferred, including drag along rights and other
non-contractual rights like staged financing and board-control rights,
intervention to interpret the term to "protect" the preferred would in
effect protect the preferred against its own risk-taking. 85 The preferred
had other alternatives to taking preferred stock, including debt, 86 and
they presumably traded off greater controlI 8 7 with preferred stock to
determine that the risks were worth it, despite the potential
uncertainties of the company and the potential waywardness of its
183. See Strine, supra note 78, at 2038-39 (discussing a variety of alternative
strategies to force a redemption that would be more protective of preferred stockholders).
184. Korsmo, supranote 7, at 1197-98.
185. As Chancellor Strine points out, "the preferred stockholders' right to mandatory
redemption in the defendant's charter was governed by language" predicated on available
cash. Strine, supranote 78, at 2030.
186. Id. at 2032.
187. With debt, debtholders cannot actively manage a company.
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directors and officers. Presumably, they made a rational tradeoff given
the risks and uncertainty and priced the deal accordingly.' 88 It was
rational behavior, despite the risk that the mandatory redemption
provision might not be very meaningful as protection, because
redemption was qualified by the need for legally available funds.
Depriving the board of the ability to make a judgment about whether
funds were legally available, and deferring to the preferred's
interpretation and mandating redemption wherever there was an
accounting "surplus," might negatively impact the company's ability to
operate after making a large redemption payment.1 89 The ex ante
prospect of this interpretation would make it more costly to secure
financing from various investors who would worry that even when there
was no cash readily available, any finding of a surplus would require
that the company honor a redemption even if it adversely affected the
company's ability to continue operating. A court deciding to ignore the
case law on "funds legally available therefor" and substitute its
judgment for that of the board might add to the costs of all transactions
in the future.190 There would be the uncertainty of the court choosing to
ignore language such as "funds legally available" that had a meaning
defined by precedent.191 In addition, because the "funds legally
available" language had been adopted rather than a provision forcing a
liquidation without constraints, the court would be giving the preferred
a better deal than they negotiated.1 92
Looking at Thought Works as rendering the preferred vulnerable to
transfers of wealth to the common ignores the ex ante perspective of
.investors of all types who furnish resources to an agent who will
manage a pool of assets for the firm. Ex ante, the investors will all want
the board to have the discretion to act to protect the firm's ability to
operate. To deprive the board of the maintenance of the cash cushion
needed to operate a profitable business would presumably depress the
market for the firm's securities and debt. So ex ante, the investors, even
the preferred, would want the board to be able to make decisions to
maintain that cushion even if ex post, when certain circumstances

188. Support for the rationality of the tradeoffs that preferred make can be seen in the
ways that venture capitalists, one class of preferred, negotiate for "control rights [that]
evolve over time." Armin Schwienbacher, Venture Capital Exits, in VENTURE CAPITAL:
INVESTMENT STRATEGIES, STRUCTURES, AND POLICIES 389, 392 (Douglas J. Cumming ed.,

2010). Since the preferred negotiate carefully on control rights, there is reason to think
that agreement to a redemption right that was qualified was not considered.
189. See Korsmo, supra note 7, at 1198.
190. Interview with M&A Lawyer, supra note 20.
191. Korsmo, supra note 7, at 1227.
192. Id.
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make a redemption preferable, the preferred would choose that outcome
despite the adverse impact on the ability to operate. Presumably we
should be asking whether the costs of depriving the board of the ability
to make decisions about the cash cushion required for a firm to prosper
would result in a net improvement in wealth.
Had the Thought Works court been willing to ignore the case law
precedent meaning of "legally available" and forced a redemption on the
basis of the preferred's argument that there was a surplus, the court
would have been extending a kind of fiduciary protection to the
preferred. But under the vaulting question framework discussed above,
it is not clear that the benefits would be worth the legal intervention,
especially since, as Professor Charles Korsmo points out, "if
ThoughtWorks attempts to redeem the preferred [shares], the surplus
no longer exists, even for the purposes of redeeming the shares."193 Am
effort to protect the preferred by interpreting the redemption to be
mandatory and unqualified might be wasteful and futile. It might also
be costly if the exact parameters of judicial efforts to protect the
preferred are uncertain. Moreover, court intervention to make the
redemption unqualified would restrict the ability of preferred
stockholders to craft the exact level of protection that they wanted. Had
they wanted the unqualified right to redemption, they could have easily
demanded such a right. The lesser protection that the preferred
negotiated in Thought Works was presumably priced accordingly.
Interpreting the provision to give the preferred an unqualified
mandatory redemption would have ignored the limits imposed by the
"legally available" qualification and given the preferred more than they
bargained for contractually. Judicially intervening when the preferred
have the clout to negotiate, or when the preferred buy stock that is
priced according to the risk undertaken, might not outweigh the costs of
a reduced choice of a spectrum of protection. Moreover, the ex ante
wealth-destroying effects of depriving the board-the agent-of the
ability to operate the firm using its discretion to preserve the firm's
ability to operate by keeping a necessary cash cushion in a volatile
business might not be worth the particular protection afforded these
preferred stockholders. The Thought Works court situated the decision
about the surplus within the realm of the board's business judgment, 194
perhaps sensing the wealth-destroying effects of a contrary decision.

193.
194.

Id. at 1198.
Id.
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Equity-Linked Investors, L.P. v. Adams19 5

The conflict between preferred and common stockholders is likely to
be particularly acute when the liquidation preference held by the
preferred is less than the value of the company if immediately
liquidated. At that juncture, the common would like to keep the
company going, because if the company can generate cash flows, the
upside will flow to the common stock. 196 However, losses will fall
disproportionately on the preferred,19 7 and they will not benefit from
the upside since they have no equity interest.
Equity-Linked
presented
that
type
of
scenario.
The
biopharmaceutical company in Equity-Linked had "several promising
technologies" but showed no profit. 198 The preferred's liquidation
preference was above the value of the company and they wanted to
liquidate and distribute the proceeds amongst themselves. The
common, however, sought additional sources of funding to develop the
technologies the firm had. 99 They successfully secured funding from
Aries, an investor group, in the form of a $3 million loan in return for
the firm issuing a $3 million bridge note accompanied by warrants that
could be exercised into common stock, making it convertible debt. 200
The preferred then sought an injunction against the Aries
borrowing. The court recognized that this real difference in the
economic interests of the preferred and common stockholders caused a
conflict, but the legal issue that formed the preferred stockholders'
claim centered on a type of fiduciary duty owed to all equity holders in a
change of control situation. 201 It then proceeded to address the legal
theories that might allow the preferred to challenge the board decision
approving the loan transaction.
The importance of the principal-agent frame for analyzing the case
and the vaulting question analysis of whether the benefits of implying
the term exceed the costs, given certain assumptions about human
behavior and the effects of legal rules prospectively on behavior, will be

195. 705 A.2d 1040 (Del. Ch. 1997).
196. Id. at 1041. The common stock would keep any residual after claims of
debtholders and fixed amounts due to the preferred had been satisfied.
197. Id. This results because "the current net worth of the company would be put at
risk in such an effort." Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 1051-52. As Walther explains, the company "obtained convertible debt
financing from an asset management fund (Aries), conditional on giving Aries the right to
appoint the majority of the board." Walther, supra note 80, at 190-91.
201. Equity-Linked, 705 A.2d at 1042-43.
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examined following a discussion of the facts and the court's legal
analysis of the fiduciary duties of the board.
The essence of the preferred's argument was that the board erred in
approving the loan transaction with Aries by not allowing the preferred
stockholders to bid at an auction for the firm. While it recognized that
the board's decision placed "economic risks upon the preferred stock," it
found no breach of any fiduciary duty, even though the board's decision
"was taken for the benefit largely of the common stock." 202 As equity

holders of stock, the preferred, like the common, are owed the same
fiduciary duties owed to all stockholders. 203 The court found no breach
"of any residual right of the preferred as owners of equity." 204 When
judging the fiduciary duty to holders of equity, the board's
"discretionary judgment is to be exercised[] to prefer the interests of
common stock." 205

In Equity-Linked, the particular legal issue that the preferred
raised was that the board violated its duty to receive the best price in a
change of control situation. 206 The Revlon case imposes that duty and is
interpreted to forbid a board, when choosing between all cash offers, to
choose the lower cash offer. 207 The board in Equity-Linked was choosing
to accept the Aries offer or to negotiate with the preferred in an
auction. 208 If one looks at Equity-Linked and thinks about the case in
the context of dual principals and a single agent operating the firm, it
makes sense that in interpreting the scope of the agent's duty to the
stockholders, the agent would have no duty to favor the preferred
merely because that particular claimant wanted to liquidate. The
agent's duty is to operate the firm and to manage the assets for the firm
and its stockholders. However, the agent would also be empowered to
act in the best interests of the firm by wiping out common stockholders
in bankruptcy and continuing the firm. The board should not be
required to fulfill its Revlon duty to allow the preferred to bid in an
auction (even where the preferred might have the highest bid) if the
preferred plan to gain control and liquidate the company. 209 If the
courts were to interpret Revlon to require the board to favor the
preferred, it would be contravening the most basic duty of the board to
202. Id. at 1042.
203. See Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A.2d 584, 593-94 (Del. Ch. 1986).
204. Equity-Linked, 705 A.2d at 1042.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 1042-43.
207. Id. at 1053-55 (citing Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506
A.2d 173 (Del. 1986)).
208. Id. at 1056.
209. See id. at 1059.
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operate the firm to maximize the return stream that will be available to
various classes of investors over the long term.
The court analyzed the board's decision by determining whether the
board owed a duty to preferred claimants and what that duty consisted
of. The court then analyzed whether there was a breach under two
different standards of review. It first analyzed the board's approval of
the loan transaction using ordinary business judgment rule scrutiny. 210
Under that general standard, which is applicable to the board's
approval of all transactions, the court found:
[The board] did not, therefore, breach a fiduciary duty owed to
the corporation or any of its equity security holders.

. .

. [Since]

the board was independent[,] it was motivated throughout by a
good faith attempt to maximize long-term corporate value[,] and
...
the board and senior management were appropriately
informed of alternatives available to implement the business
plan that the directors sought to achieve.211
Next, the court recognized the plaintiffs central argument that the
board had special augmented duties since there was a change in control.
Once conceptualized in that way, Revlon duties apply to the board and
impose a duty to "search for the best deal." 2 12 The court then faced

whether a different, more stringent standard applied to the board,
210. The standard of review in stockholder litigation is deferential to the directors. To
violate their duty of care to stockholders, directors must act in violation of the standard of
review, which is the business judgment rule. 'The business judgment rule ...
is a
presumption that 'in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an
informed basis, . . . and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests
of the company [and its shareholders]."' In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d
693, 746-47 (Del. Ch. 2005) (alteration in original) (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.25
805, 812 (Del. 1984)), aff'd, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006). The rationale for the business
judgment rule is the reason for a deferential reason of care, that "directors are not liable
for losses due to imprudence or honest errors of judgment." Cox & HAZEN, supra note 180,
at 482-83. The fiduciary duty of care can be likened to the corporate waste standard in
stockholder litigation. In Delaware, corporate waste is akin to bad faith. See Disney, 907
A.2d at 749. "In other words, waste is a rare, 'unconscionable case[ where directors
irrationally squander or give away corporate assets."' Id. (alteration in original) (quoting
Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 263 (Del. 2000)). The deferential standard of review for
directors in the duty of care context is easily distinguished from the entire fairness
standard applied in the duty of loyalty context. The duty of loyalty requires that directors
use their position of trust to further the corporation's best interests, and not any of the
directors' private interests. Id. at 751. In conclusion, the duty of care standard of review is
much less deferential to directors in the duty of loyalty context than it is with the
business judgment rule and waste standard.
211. Equity-Linked, 705 A.2d at 1053.
212. Id. at 1043.
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which depended on whether the Revlon duty applied because it was a
change of control case. Revlon imposes a duty to search for the best
deal, which means that when choosing between two all cash offers, the
board cannot fulfill its duties if it chooses the lower cash offer. The court
found that the board had fulfilled its duty. The court found that even if
the more stringent standard of review applied, the board's approval of
the loan satisfied the board's duty "to reasonably attempt to advance
the current interests (or value) of the holders of the corporation's equity
securities." 213

The preferred sought a court-ordered auction at which the preferred
would bid. They argued that "the board's failure to afford the preferred
stock an opportunity to meet or exceed the Aries proposal" meant that
"the board failed reasonably to maximize the current value of the firm's
equity." 214
However, in Equity-Linked, the board was not deciding between two
cash offers. Had the board pursued the preferred offer in an auction, it
may have outbid Aries. However, the court determined that the
"preferred's aim might be simply to liquidate the company and take all
of the net proceeds and apply it to its preference." 215 Thus the board was
weighing the value offered by the Aries deal, which included the value
of being able to pursue its technologies, which would permit the
company to continue with Aries owning all common stock so that "its
economic incentives [were] more aligned" 216 with the board's long-term
vision for the company than the preferred's own offer. The board-as
agent-must be able to determine whether the preferred bidding in an
auction for the distressed firm would not be in the long-term interests of
the firm, especially when their only interest was in liquidating the firm
and receiving their preference. In evaluating these offers, the court
held, the board met its enhanced duties triggered by the change of
control under Revlon "to have the single aim of maximizing the present
value of the firm's equity." 217
Some have attacked the decision refusing to find that a fiduciary
duty required the board to order the auction requested by the preferred
as an "ambush" on the preferred and as a decision that "casts the board
as a bully."2 1 8 Critics find there is oppression of the preferred and that

Equity-Linked stands for the proposition that "the board may even have

213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

Id. at 1056, 1058.
Id. at 1056.
Id. at 1057-58.
Id. at 1058.
Id.
See, e.g., Walther, supra note 80, at 190.
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a fiduciary duty to siphon value from the preferred when the
opportunity arises." 219 Others, such as Chancellor Strine, think denial
of the injunction against the loan makes sense since "the board owes no
fiduciary duty to maximize the value of the preferred or to favor . . . the

preferred over the common, except when contractually required." 220
The holding of Equity-Linked is that there is no fiduciary duty to
favor the preferred as preferred and that when "push comes to
shove," 221 the board has a duty to favor the common over the preferred
when exercising discretionary judgment. This makes sense under the
principal-agent, cost-minimizing, and value -maximizing frameworks for
the firm analysis articulated here. Under the principal-agent
framework, the preferred and common both furnish resources to an
agent who is going to act to further the interests of the firm. The agent
makes the necessary tradeoffs between present and future value,
acquiring options on future investment opportunities, investing in new
projects, and deciding between actions on the contract curve that are
not wealth-sacrificing. The risk-return profile of the decisions, however,
is different and may affect different classes of claimants differently.
Under this framework, the preferred are not able to argue that there is
a duty to favor the preferred as preferred beyond the duty owed to all
equity stockholders. The general linguistic gloss in the case law urging
the board to favor the common goes back to the duty of the agent to
foster the long-term value maximization of the firm, since the interest
of the common stock is generally more aligned with that goal.
Under this principal-agent model, it would be strange if the EquityLinked court decided that the board's duty included favoring the
preferred over the common without taking account of the effect on the
firm of favoring the preferred over the common. The duty is to favor the
common over the preferred generally because, given the risk-return
profile of the common, that strategy is thought to favor the long-term
growth of the firm. But that duty to favor the common is not without
limits and must be read against the background of the board's duty to
the firm. Thus, contrary to Professor Walther's suggestion, this Article
rejects reading Equity-Linked to sanction an invariable principle
warranting the siphoning of value from the preferred to the common.
That reading of Equity-Linked would violate the agent's duty to the
firm and thus would not pass muster.

219. Id. at 164 (emphasis added).
220. Strine, supra note 78, at 2028.
221. Korsmo, supra note 7, at 1176 ("When push comes to shove, any preference
granted to the preferred stockholders must necessarily come at the expense of the
common stockholders.").
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Alternatively, if the board were under a duty to sabotage the
preferred from day one (as Professor Walther alleges Equity-Linked
does) to subtract value from the preferred in favor of wealth transfers to
the common, would that pass muster? Would the duty to favor the
common mean that the board must carefully scrutinize the contract
terms of the preferred and use various techniques like subsidiary
mergerS 222 to reduce the power of the preferred? 223 Although critics
suggest that the board is incentivized by Equity-Linked to "siphon" off
value from the preferred, in fact the board's fiduciary duty is to manage
assets to maximize the value of the firm. In most cases, this duty will
mean favoring the common over the preferred. But presumably it would
be a violation of the board's duty to siphon off value from the preferred
from day one, regardless of whether that wealth transfer was in the
interest of the firm. For similar reasons, it would be a violation of the
board's fiduciary duty if it decided that it would never act against the
common, even if it were in the best interests of the firm. For that
reason, we assume it would be a violation to conclude that the board
must elect to sabotage the preferred if there is any chance of helping the
common. Sabotaging the preferred is only allowed if it is in the best
long-term interest of the firm.
Conducting the firm's business always to sabotage the preferred
would deprive management of the ability to perform certain actions,
such as effectuating an out-of-court restructuring to dilute the existing
common shareholders and replace them with new common
shareholders, even when doing so would be in the best interests of the
firm. It should not be harder for the board to manage the corporation so
it can survive as an entity. Were the board to act in that manner and
engage in any action to disfavor the preferred and to favor the common,
the board would be violating its fiduciary duty to manage the resources
of the claimants for the best interests of the firm. Moreover, depriving
the board of the discretion to take actions in the interests of the firm,
even when claimants are adversely affected, would be wealthdestroying rather than wealth-enhancing. The agent is being hired to
exercise its business judgment, not to favor one class of claimants
regardless of the effects on the firm. Moreover, the costs of interpreting
fiduciary duty to allow the board always to act to disfavor the preferred
and to favor the common is a rule that would not be preferred by
common stockholders, since it might make it harder to get financing
222. See generally David Feirstein, Parents and Subsidiaries in Delaware: A
Dysfunctional Standard, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUs. 479, 481-87 (2006).
223. Another technique would be to use its power to refuse to grant the preferred
concessions in the express terms designed to prevent such wealth transfers.
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from banks and from preferred stock. Moreover, banks and debtholders,
as well as many preferred stockholders, would not prefer an
interpretation of fiduciary duty that mandates wealth transfers to
common, as it would wipe out the firm's value.
The critics who see Equity-Linked as an abuse of preferred
stockholderS 224 seem to remove the conflict from the principal-agent
context in which the agent is tasked with the operation of the firm. The
agent must be able to wipe out the common if it is in the firm's best
interests or similarly be able to take actions that hurt the preferred if
that is in the firm's best interests.
Viewing Equity-Linked through the principal-agent lens helps one
to understand why the case's outcome makes sense. It also helps to rule
out the more extreme readings of what conduct would be allowable
under the court's holding. Contrary to Walther's suggestion, the
decision cannot be read as requiring the board to siphon value from the
preferred "when the opportunity arises." 225
This Article's analysis also helps to make sense of the case. The
court holding can be read as a decision which refuses to impose an
additional fiduciary duty on the board to favor the preferred at the
point in time they want to exit. But since the preferred could easily
have negotiated for a provision that would have forced liquidation in
such circumstances, there do not seem to be compelling reasons to adopt
it, especially since that adoption would have a negative effect on the
other securities of the issuer that would be subject to this additional
non-bargained-for protection, thereby making the costs of adoption
greater than its benefits.
V. NON-VC CASES WHERE OBSTACLES TO BARGAINING ARE FORMIDABLE:
A DIFFERENT APPROACH FOR PREFERRED STOCKHOLDERS
There are other situations outside the VC context where the
barriers to negotiating contractual protections for the preferred are
much more substantial. Therefore, the general rule that preferred
stockholders must depend exclusively on negotiated contractual
protections seems problematic, especially where the shares are not
publicly traded. Preferred stockholders in the VC context can
presumably bargain for all the protections they want, and they are
compensated for any additional risk by the lower market price or higher
dividends even if they do not have contractual protections. 226
224.
225.
226.

See Bratton & Wachter, supranote 2, at 1820, 1851.
Walther, supra note 80, at 164.
Strine, supra note 78, at 2028.
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Preferred stock is often issued where the holders have no direct
bargaining power and there is no underwriter massaging the terms on
their behalf. 227 The legal adjudicator must recognize that the barriers to

self-protection through contractual provisions may be significantly
greater than if the preferred shares were issued to a sophisticated
counterparty in a VC financing or financing preferred arrangement.
These other settings in which preferred stock is issued suggest that
an adjudicator should analyze the legal intervention differently
depending on the particular context of the preferred stock. Even with a
lack of clout or no direct negotiation and no underwriter, legal
intervention for the preferred may not be efficient. If there are
sophisticated buyers and publicly traded preferred shares, then even
without the power to negotiate contractual protections, the market price
can correctly value the weaknesses of the particular express terms. In
such cases, the market price discount will achieve the ultimacy of
maximizing the gains from exchange. What the preferred give up in
express contractually negotiated provisions because they lack
bargaining power will be compensated for in the exchange by a lower
price for the shares.
In other instances, there might not be publicly traded preferred
shares. If the preferred do not have the opportunity to negotiate directly
and there is no market trading price accounting for weaknesses in
contractual protections because the stock is not publicly traded, then
the intervention analysis would be different.
For example, imagine that a father owns a company. The parents
have four daughters. Two daughters follow Dad into the business while
two daughters start different careers. Dad sets up his estate plan to
give the two daughters in the company common stock and the two other
daughters preferred stock, giving them a stream of dividends and
providing for mandatory redemption/buyout terms, and he thinks that
the daughters with preferred stock are protected. Then Dad dies and
the common stock gives two daughters absolute control. They enrich
themselves through inflated salaries and spin off of assets to
themselves, which Dad did not adequately guard against with express
contract terms for the preferred.
This scenario raises the question of whether the daughters, who
hold preferred shares, should have any claims against the daughters
holding common stock, and under what legal theory. For example,
should the daughters with preferred get any additional protections
beyond the negotiated contract terms of the preferred stock and beyond

227.

Interview with M&A Lawyer, supra note 20.
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the fiduciary duties owed to all stockholders? Or are they limited to
what the contract provides? 228
Whether the law should intervene to supply an additional fiduciary
duty to the preferred as preferred in the case to protect the daughters
holding preferred stock should depend on whether this type of lawsupplied rule would maximize welfare. That depends on whether the
particular suggested intervention-expanding
the performance
obligation to create protection for the preferred as preferred-would
achieve the ultimacy of maximizing gains without negative offsetting
effects. If the daughters with preferred demonstrate that the daughters
with common stock have control and used it to deplete the company's
assets, that may constitute a waste of assets and the daughters with
preferred would be able to. recover under the fiduciary duty owed to all
stockholders, including preferred under Jedwab, and intervention to
create additional fiduciary protection might not be needed. Similarly, if
the daughters with preferred can protect themselves through the
implied covenant of fair dealing applicable to all contracts, the costs of
the law intervening with a special protective fiduciary duty may not be
efficient.
To determine if the law should imply a fiduciary protection
provision for the preferred stockholder daughters, one needs to ask
whether the imposition of this additional duty, not bargainedfor, would
cause harm to the remaining common stockholders. If so, it would not
be value-maximizing. In cases involving sophisticated investors who
bought and negotiated claims that met their risk/return profile, adding
fiduciary protection ex post would change the risk/return value for the
future returns of the common stockholders in ways that could not be
anticipated, 229 saddling them with the additional burden of the
fiduciary duty for the preferred. This would give the preferred more
protection than they actually paid for and ensure them a higher return
than the risk/profile associated with their purchase of preferred stock.
These projected costs to the common stockholder are a negative
effect of adding a fiduciary protection for the preferred. It seems less
compelling or nonexistent where the stock is created as part of an estate

228. The normal rule applicable to preferred shares relegates the preferred to their
contractual rights unless the preferred can demonstrate a violation of a duty owed to all
stockholders. See Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A.2d 584, 594 (Del. Ch. 1986).
229. See Coffey, Firm Opportunities, supra note 21, at 160 n.19. The hit to the common
from additional protection to the preferred would be unanticipated because the essential
nature of the preferred investment is that all protections must be contractually negotiated
or they will not be recognized.
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plan and the children are being given stock. 230 The argument that
adding fiduciary protection will cause a hit to a class of stockholder,
such as the common stockholder, who purchased on the assumption
that the preferred would be afforded no protection beyond the
contractual terms, seems less compelling, since in the case of a gift to
the common they did not negotiate the terms of their investment. Even
where the insider pays for the common stock, it is really a gift, 231
though structured differently for tax reasons, and not a third-party
negotiated transaction. And since the common stock insiders did not
invest dollars, it is hard to posit a hit to their investment by a change in
the risk/return for the common from implying a duty on the part of the
board to the preferred stockholders. Moreover, in such cases, adding
additional fiduciary protection for a class of preferred from the board
might be welfare-maximizing because: (1) it might disincentivize
common stockholders from depleting the assets of the company; (2) it
might disincentivize them from acting opportunistically; (3) doing so
would not result in a hit to an investment purchased on a certain
risk/return profile or assumptions about the limits of protection for the
preferred; and (4) the common stock insiders might anticipate that
family members would owe extra obligations to other family members
so that even if the common stockholders paid for the stock, they
presumably paid for the stock with the anticipation that they would not
be able to enrich themselves through inflated salaries and spin off of
assets to themselves to the detriment of their family members (sisters)
holding preferred stock. The fourth point reinforces the concept that
"[s]hifts of wealth .

.

. in favor of' one class of claimants can occur only

where the parties "do not perfectly anticipate future wealth-shifting
probabilities." 232 Where the common stockholder can anticipate that a
court would police against this and protect preferred stockholders in the
family setting, the wealth-shifting would be anticipated and priced into
the investment. Thus, there would be no loss in wealth from a rule
protecting the preferred through a good faith obligation.
Another case in which the ordinary rule relegating preferred to
their contractual protections and denying all fiduciary protection to the
preferred should be questioned occurs in the public preferred stock
context. Once the initial stock is sold and then resold, there is no
opportunity for the subsequent purchasers of preferred stock to

230. A different calculus would obtain where the insider paid to acquire stock from the
parent/owners.
231. It
might be structured
differently for tax reasons.
See Dwight
Drake, Transitioningthe Family Business, 83 WASH. L. REV. 123, 132 (2008).
232. Coffey, Firm Opportunities,supra note 21, at 173.
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negotiate any contractual protections. 233 The company may have normal
public finance preferred stock terms from a deal in which a "blue chip"
placement agent found more than fifty large institutional purchasers;
the debentures were subsequently registered for public resale and have
been resold into both bond mutual funds and to individuals of unknown
sophistication or wealth. Thus, it may not make sense for those holders
to rely on the contract protections negotiated at the initial sale,
particularly in cases where the market might not signal the lack of
protection through a discount.
This case is illustrated by a company investing in a new line of
products. For example, as a direct result of the normal business
operations seeking to improve product performance, the management
team discovers a concept for a potential new product line of Wowies, a
small device that tracks the location of the company's products
geographically (where on Earth) and spatially (how high off the
earth) 234 and monitors the efficiency of the products in use. Wowies, if
affixed to all of the company's products, would allow the company to
track the usage of their products throughout their life cycle, allowing
the company to better service the customers by recommending repairs,
maintenance, and, ultimately, replacement. And the firm sees valuemaximizing potential, since it could enable the company to sell its
products for increased prices. Wowies would also be useful to many
other manufacturers. There would be no more guesswork about how
customers are using or abusing products like airplanes, trains, buses,
trucks, and automobiles. If first to the market, the company could
transform its business from industrial manufacturing to information
technology.
Development of Wowies is clearly outside the primary skillset of the
company's managers, and although the company's research engineers
include folks who can initiate the Wowie development, they must be
supplemented by new specialists. It is also going to be hugely
expensive. It will, however, drain the company's cash resources to a
degree that could threaten the company's ongoing business flexibility,
reduce the amount of dollars available for research and development of
its aerospace parts, and could, in the worst case, threaten its survival in
a cyclical downturn. The charter provides, as normal, that the
corporation may engage in any lawful act or activity that corporations
may be formed for. There are no specific covenants in the preferred

233. Even preferred stock issued by large private companies can resemble these
characteristics of public preferred stock.
234. Mobile Asset Tracking System and Method, GOOGLE PATENTS (July 17, 2012),
https://www.google.com/patents/US8223009.
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stock terms covering changes in business model. The preferred has a
liquidation preference over the common stock, as well as various rights
of redemption and class voting rights, none of which are triggered by a
change in the business model 235 (one potential basis for a class vote is
eliminated because the company's "purpose clause" is broad enough to
preclude the need to amend the charter).
So far, this example illustrates a potential risk to the company from
entering a new venture with little background and a largely uncertain
payoff. The company has a few large common shareholders who control
the company's voting power and the board. There are several
independent directors, people who have social relationships with
management and/or the large shareholders, but also some who were
found through normal director search mechanisms in advance of a
possible IPO.
The corporation has issued a $10,000,000 liquidation preference of
preferred stock and has $10,010,000 in net assets, sufficient to pay off
the preferred in liquidation and leaving $10,000 for the
common. Further, imagine Carl Icahn has bought common stock for
$10,000 as an option on a corporate recovery.
The controlling common shareholders look at the business
opportunity and decide that it is worth taking. The board decides that
the risk/reward of throwing money at the new idea justifies spending
ninety percent of the company's profits on the new venture, instead of
stockpiling half of those monies to cover business downturns, because
the business move is the only way to create value for the common and
for the firm, even though it risks the preferred's recovery. If successful,
they may have a new Google, and in the worst case they lose and the
company goes bankrupt. But the company thinks it is more likely
to suffer some hard times during the next (inevitable) business
downturn. The company has a virtually zero chance of bankruptcy
absent this decision; it has a dominant, near monopoly on a key
industrial component, and it has a strong track record of incremental
growth over seventy-five years. The role of the board is to identify
opportunities that will provide long-term growth through investment in
new ventures but also to be prudent and avoid taking gambles that will
bankrupt the company.
A few years later, the company goes bankrupt because of the
sudden advent of an adverse business cycle. The company is unable to
meet its debt obligations as they are due (its refinancing sources dried
235. If this were an early stage venture capital scenario, there is virtually zero chance
that the preferred stock would not have specific protection against changes in the
business model.
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up, and its cash reserves had been sunk into the development of
Wowies, which have not yet paid off). There are sufficient assets to pay
off the company's debt, but the preferred gets nothing. Can the preferred
sue the board for breach of fiduciary duty?
This type of fact pattern raises a horizontal conflict between the
preferred and the common. 236 The ordinary view is that there is no
special duty to the preferred and that the preferred have to depend on
their contractual protections or price downward for greater risk. .But
where the ability to build in contractual protections is not realistic, one
begins to question whether the principle of common value maximizing
is best for the firm. This may be the precise case where no rational
investor would view the investment in a positive way and would view
any investment in such a new venture as reckless. Only when looked at
exclusively from the perspective of the common does the investment
appear rational, especially when the chances of success are very low
and may precipitate the firm's bankruptcy.
In this kind of case it is difficult to put a real value on proceeding
with the investment for the firm. There is no track record. There is
great uncertainty as to whether another entrepreneur will beat the firm
and invent its own version of Wowies. So valuation in such cases is a
matter of guesswork. Of course, the firm could get a valuation done, but
it may not be accurate or realistic. Here, the company is proposing to
invest its own money so its valuation is not likely to be nearly as
accurate as when someone proposes to invest newly in such a venture.
In such a case, contract protections are not realistic because of the
lack of a real opportunity to negotiate for terms and because the
market's inability to account for the risk may be non-existent due to the
stock being held in a mutual fund, where the lack of protective terms
may not be salient enough to affect the price. More importantly, as
discussed earlier, the stock price may not reflect the lack of protection
for the preferred stockholder for an important reason: the preferred
stockholder may fail to discount the price paid for the stock. Even
though the stock agreement might lack protections, the preferred
stockholder has other protections. Thus he will only fund in stages, 237
and the lack of contract protection will not cause the initial purchaser to
discount the price, causing the later purchaser to buy at a price that
236. It may seem like an unlikely scenario since a large established company would
seem to have other avenues for raising the necessary dollars other than through issuing
preferred stock. Normally, such an established company could borrow money through a
bank loan. However, the bank may be reluctant to lend when the business model changes,
thus necessitating the resort to preferred stock.
237. See generally Gompers, supra note 99 (discussing staged financing as a protective
device for venture capital).
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does not fully reflect the lack of protection. Moreover, even if the initial
agreement contains protections and the preferred stockholder pays a
price to reflect those protections, they may be negotiated in a side deal
between the VC preferred stockholder and the founders, or between a
company and a preferred share investor in a side deal whose terms do
not find their way into the express terms of the preferred. So the VCs
agree to certain terms (voting power, dividends, conversion, liquidation,
etc.) that will live on always and forever, and these are in the
amendment to the articles of incorporation or certificate of designation
(in Delaware), and can only be later changed with the requisite
shareholder vote and also may require board approval if that is a state
law requirement.
Shareholder agreements, however, routinely provide for additional
terms between the contracting parties. 238 These could include
registration rights, for example, requiring the issuer to file a
registration statement with the SEC. But others may include negative
covenants or even positive covenants affecting the makeup of the board,
or rights of first refusal, or other rights personal to the VCs. Some of
these rights may be transferable, but others may not be except by
operation of law (merger, for example). 239 These shareholder
agreements will not transfer to subsequent purchasers of the preferred
stock.
This means that the price of the securities should be higher to
reflect less risk due to protections such as staged financing or
contractual protections that sophisticated market participants have
that other subsequent buyers will not have.
With subsequent purchasers who lack the original protections that
the VCs have, one needs to determine whether the lack of protections
238. One might ask: why not put these terms into the charter? Because they are often
complex and are usually viewed as personal to the party demanding them, not something
that any and all unknown strangers should be given. Here is an example of a clause in a
Stock Purchase Agreement that would keep the benefit of the protection personal as
between the original contracting parties:
This STOCK PURCHASE AGREEMENT, dated as of November 23, 2015, (this
"Agreement"), is made and entered into by and among Pro Star Freight Systems
Inc. and Pro Star Truck Center Inc. (collectively, the "Company') ....
... Third Party Beneficiaries. This Agreement is solely for the benefit of the
parties hereto and no provision of this Agreement shall be deemed to confer upon
third parties, either express or implied, any remedy, claim, liability,
reimbursement, cause of action or other right.
Stock Purchase Agreement by HydroPhi Technologies Group, Inc., LAW INSIDER: CONT.
DATABASE & SEARCH ENGINE (Nov. 24, 2015), https://www.lawinsider.com/contracts/
3FLslY8Mw2rCO6kvVGed8z/hydrophi-technologies-group-inc/new-york/2015-11-24.
239. Interview with M&A Lawyer, supra note 20.
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will be priced into the securities of subsequent purchasers. It will be
lower than the price paid by the original purchasers. If the market is
pricing in the lack of such protections, then arguably there is no need
for fiduciary protections for the subsequent purchasers as they will pay
a discounted price. This would be true under the efficient capital
market hypothesis, under which the pricing of a security reflects "all
available information about the security." 240
If there is a well-developed and thick market for preferred shares,
and if all subsequent purchasers will lack the original protections, then
the market price to those purchasers should reflect the lack of such
protections.
However, the disciplining and market pricing effects may be
attenuated for two reasons. First, the market for preferred stock may be
harder to price and not as efficient as the market for common stock.241 If
that is the case, and if the market pricing is less efficient, then there
may be a greater need for a fiduciary protection for the subsequent
purchasers of preferred stock.
Even if market pricing of the stock for subsequent purchasers of
preferred stock is accurate, if everyone involved would still want a
limited fiduciary obligation of the kind suggested in this Article, there
might be reason to adopt it as a majority preferred default rule. The
initial VC entrepreneurs would conceivably lower their cost of capital if
people would pay more for preferred stock with a limited fiduciary
protection. Preferred investors would presumably like the protection
against expropriation.
However, to justify an implied term of limited fiduciary protection
suggested here, one must ask: why do issuers not include the
protections voluntarily? If such limited fiduciary protections would add
value, presumably investors would be willing to pay for them and
companies that did not offer them would be at a competitive
disadvantage and would have a higher cost of capital. The answer is
that the initial holders of preferred stock (the VCs) have other
protections that render fiduciary duty protection superfluous. So, the
initial VCs and issuers will not include them, and if subsequent
purchasers trade in a relatively inefficient market where the price

240. Charles R. Korsmo, The Audience for Corporate Disclosure, 102 IOWA L. REV.
1581, 1606-07 (2017); see also Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of
Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383, 383, 388 (1970).

241.

See Don Wenk, Valuation Issues with Respect to Preferred Stock,

KOTZIN

VALUATION PARTNERS (Oct. 2006), https://www.kotzinvaluation.com/articles/preferredstock.
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signals are attenuated and do not accurately reflect the lack of
protections, limited fiduciary protection might be justified.
Another issue that might impact the accurate pricing of the lack of
fiduciary protections for subsequent purchasers is the costliness of
getting that information to the market. As Professors Gilson and
Kraakman have argued, "information costs determine how widely
particular information is distributed in a market, and therefore the
relative efficiency of the market mechanism that incorporates it into
price." 242 In the case of a company that issues initial stock to large

institutional investors and then registers those securities for public
resale, or when stock initially sold to VCs is then later resold to later
purchasers, the fundamental question is whether the market will take
account of the lack of fiduciary protection as an element of the pricing
at the resale point. Initially, the institutional investors or VCs have
other means of protecting themselves that cause them not to discount
the stock for lack of any fiduciary protection. But when the securities
are resold, the market would have to focus on the lack of fiduciary
protection as a new piece of information justifying a repricing of the
securities. However, since the ordinary rule is a lack of any fiduciary
protection for preferred, the market may fail to price that, even though
the fact that the public investors are buying the stock without other
protective devices such as staged financing may make the lack of such
fiduciary protection a more important factor. However, it may remain
non-salient due to its background as the ordinary rule which denies
fiduciary protection to preferred. In addition, the market would have to
account for the fact that the protective provisions that extended to the
initial purchasers are no longer available to the public investors. The
market may have difficulty pricing the fall-off or absence of initial
protections which make the absence of fiduciary protection more
critical.
A key argument that supports the imposition of a limited fiduciary
duty in the particular context of publicly traded preferred shares goes
back to Professors Merrill and Smith. They argue that when
information costs are too great, there are great reasons to adopt
standardization and limit individually crafted terms. At other times,
when the information costs are lower, the benefits of customization may
outweigh the benefits of standardization. They argue "that the numerus
clausus [limiting the creation of new property rights] strikes a rough

242.

Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Market Efficiency After the Financial

Crisis:It's Still a Matter of Information Costs, 100 VA. L. REV. 313, 330 (2014).
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balance between" 243 the effort "to minimize the sum of measurement
(and error) costs, frustration costs, and administrative costs." 244 Courts
will be drawn to recast new interests as "one of the recognized forms." 245
Courts hesitate to recognize new property rights and embrace
standardization due to the information costs that courts "must expend
...
to determine the attributes of these rights." 246 Standardization
saves on these information costs.
These information costs similarly can help explain why
standardization in the form of a limited fiduciary duty may make sense,
since the benefits of customization and individually crafted protections
would be outweighed by information costs. The information costs are
those identified earlier, namely the costs of the subsequent purchasers
and third parties of determining that the lack of fiduciary protection is
a new piece of information justifying a repricing of the securities given
the absence of transferable customized protections, such as staged
financing, that are not available to the subsequent purchasers. On the
other hand, when sophisticated VCs are involved, the benefits of
customization will outweigh the costs of information, so it will make
sense to restrict the original VC purchasers of preferred stock to their
contracts.
Thus it might make sense to create a limited fiduciary duty to
protect against (1) intentional destruction of the value for the preferred,
and (2) reckless investment. As one colleague pointed out, my proposal
applies a deferential duty of care standard to a specific species of duty
of loyalty context: where the board's self-interest problems are not
necessarily as acute as in other duty of loyalty contexts where the
directors are alleged to be favoring themselves. Thus, the stringent
intrinsic fairness standard that would normally apply seems inapt. 247
Implying such limited fiduciary obligations would create value by
discouraging reckless investment behavior. Such a limited right would
not decrease the value of the firm or add to transaction costs. It would
not put the board in the position of balancing the interests of the
stockholders in a way that might lead to a standstill or discourage
prudent risk-taking by agents. The fiduciary obligations would simply
243.

Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of

Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE. L.J. 1, 38-40 (2000).
244. Id. at 38.
245. Id. at 3.
246. Id. at 8.
247. There may be some overlap with the idea of a conflict of interest, that of a common
controlled board favoring the common stockholders over the preferred stockholders, but
only when it is in the best interests of the firm, not simply in favor of the common
stockholder interest.
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rule out investments that would be considered grossly irrational unless
they are evaluated solely from the perspective of the common
stockholder who has already lost the bet on the company. One could
look to other contexts such as insurance companies, which are limited to
legal investments, 24 8 as a standard by which to judge whether the
investment was grossly irrational.
Why imply such an obligation? First, the parties may not be able to
contract on a solution to reckless action by the board, as explained
below; the contracting difficulties are just too great. Second, the parties
who buy preferred stock subsequently in mutual funds had no
opportunity to bargain for contractual protection against a change in
business, and other types of contractual protections, such as a right to a
put 249 whenever the preferred wants to exit, would not be enforceable.
Even if there were an opportunity to bargain, unsophisticated parties
might assume that a specific contractual protection would be
unnecessary. They might assume that boards constrained to act for the
firm could not act recklessly and thus would not include a provision.
Third, the alternative protection of buying at a discount may not work
because the unsophisticated buyer would not know how to assess the
risk of the lack of fiduciary protection against waste and reckless
investment, and thus the market would not price the risk accurately.
Finally, for the reasons discussed earlier, the pricing signals may be
attenuated, and thus one cannot depend on market pricing to give the
subsequent purchaser an accurate signal of the true value of the stock
given its lack of contractual protections.
The counterargument to implying a fiduciary duty is that once a
fiduciary duty is imposed ex post, the other claimant, the common
stock, is saddled with a new and unanticipated obligation. 250 That adds
costs and thus implying the obligation would not necessarily result in
lower total costs. Here, if there is a broad obligation to refrain from
acting recklessly against the preferred in a limited set of contexts where
the preferred could not contractually protect themselves, would there be
a reaction by the common to immediately recontract around the result

248. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3907.14 (LexisNexis 2018).
249. The owner of a put option has the right to sell an underlying security at a
specified price within a specified timeframe, and often to a specified buyer. See IAN AYRES,
OPTIONAL LAW: THE STRUCTURE OF LEGAL ENTITLEMENTS 15 (2005) (discussing origin of

put options).
250. It would be unanticipated under the general rule that the only duties to the
preferred are to honor the terms of the contractual agreement with the preferred and the
duty owed to all stockholders (enforceable through a derivative action) to refrain from
wasting corporate assets or to engage in self-dealing.
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and to include language in future deals to expressly allow the board to
act recklessly against the preferred?
In order to determine the recontracting costs, one must focus on the
two junction points at which parties buy preferred stock and the role of
the common stockholders. At the initial purchase, the common
stockholder would buy the common stock on the expectation that the
board could act recklessly against the preferred and that the preferred
would have bought on that assumption and paid a discounted price to
reflect that lack of fiduciary protection. However, the unsophisticated
investor buying preferred stock has no ability to contract over such
matters, and the buyer of public preferred stock may not know enough
to deal with the risk of the lack of fiduciary protection. The public
buyers of such preferred stock know that they do not know enough.
Thus, the underwriters will have to knock the price down even further
to cause them to buy such stock. Therefore, imposing a restraint against
such behavior would not depress the value of the firm or add to
recontracting costs. Moreover, there is reason to believe that had the
unsophisticated buyers of preferred stock been able to bargain for an
implied obligation against reckless action against the preferred, they
would have done so or would have decided not to purchase, or they
would have paid a highly discounted price.
Moreover, as pointed out earlier, the lack of protection against
waste might not be priced into the stock initially, especially where the
preferred stockholders have other protections such as staged financing.
This may make the pricing of the stock inaccurate as the preferred
stockholder will ignore the lack of protection against waste due to other
non-contractual devices for protection.
If the price does not accurately reflect the risk the subsequent
preferred is taking, and there is no implied fiduciary protection of any
kind, then the preferred must depend on the contract. However, as
outlined below, there are reasons to question whether a contract
solution makes sense. One reason for questioning the contract solution
to the situation of directors favoring the common by pursuing a reckless
option is that the party (the corporation) in certain public preferred
contracts with the preferred holders (through selling the shares) is not
the perpetrator or beneficiary of the "wrongful behavior" if there is
any. The "wrongdoers" are the directors, and the beneficiaries of the
"wrongdoing" are the common holders. But neither the common holders
nor the directors are in privity with the preferred shareholders. So
there is a contract attempting to limit "wrongful" behavior by people
(the directors) that the entity does not control (indeed, it is the one
controlled by the wrongdoers and their beneficiaries). The alternative
suggestion for a contract solution in which the preferred can require the
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directors and common holders to sign on as guarantors would not occur
in the public corporate finance setting. 251
Contract solutions are also problematic because the "wrongful"
action by the directors may be irreversible, and the negative impact on
the preferred may result in the destruction of the entity's entire value
so that payment of damages by the entity to restore the status quo ante
is impossible. And if the Hail Mary investment fails, the common will
not actually receive any benefits, so there is nothing to recoup from
them even if a viable cause of action could be found (if the Hail Mary
succeeded, there would be no complaint by the preferred since the
assets were not lost). And absent finding a fiduciary duty owed to the
preferred, there is no direct claim against the directors.
Although there is no special "self-dealing" other than benefitting
common shareholders in general, the board recognizes that the
preferred shares are taking the same risk as the common (buffered to a
small degree by the value of the common), but will receive no direct
reward for the new venture. And although the preferred took that risk
when they bought stock without the upside that the common would
have, they risk that the agent will act to benefit the common at their
expense. This risk of adverse action is magnified when the ability to
negotiate contractual protections is assumed not to be possible.
Perhaps the only solution to this situation might be to imply a
fiduciary duty to the preferred. This duty would protect the preferred
against reckless behavior by the board. It would be harder to argue on
these facts that the preferred should be relegated solely to contract
protections, because many preferred bought after the initial issuance
and the opportunity to negotiate for protection against reckless
behavior would be nonexistent. Even if one argues that the preferred
who bought subsequently should discount the price to reflect the
absence of protection against reckless behavior, the preferred would not
have thought there was a need to discount the purchase price for the
stock; unsophisticated purchasers might assume that the board is
constrained from reckless behavior, and therefore they might pay a
price premised on non-reckless behavior by the board or, knowing that
they do not know enough, would be reluctant to buy until the price was
knocked down even below the price that reflects the lack of fiduciary
protection against reckless investment.
Finally, implying a limited fiduciary duty against reckless action
(such that no reasonable investor would take looking at the valuation
question for the firm in an objective fashion and not solely from the

251.

Interview with M&A Lawyer, supra note 20.

112

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:43

perspective of the common) would incentivize investment. Otherwise,
investors in preferred stock who buy in the secondary market with no
opportunity to negotiate contractual protections will be wary of
investing.
One objection is that this proposal would require judges to make
case-by-case determinations as to whether fiduciary review is
appropriate. There are normally costs associated with judicial
determinations that are contextually based, but in this case the judge
would be looking at readily ascertainable factors. The judge would need
first to determine whether the stock was issued in the family context
where the preferred were family members who lacked the ability to
negotiate the terms of an illiquid security. Second, the judge would
determine if the purchaser was a subsequent purchaser of preferred
stock without any ability to negotiate terms in situations where the
initial price might have been inaccurate due to other non-contractual
protections that made the preferred stockholder confident in the
investment, even without protection against reckless investment.
Would issuers of preferred stock in this narrow group of settings
(not the VC context, etc.) react to such a rule by contracting around it
because its addition would add to transaction costs or fail to maximize
value? It would seem that if the board wishes to retain the ability to
pursue investments that would be considered reckless when considered
in an objective fashion and would only be considered to have a positive
value when considered solely from the perspective of the common stock,
the issuer should be bound by a default rule of limited fiduciary
protection against reckless investment. Or the issuer should have to opt
out and have to disclose to preferred investors who lack bargaining
power that the board intends to retain the power to: (1) intentionally
destroy the preferred wherever possible and siphon off value from the
preferred from the start in order to benefit the common, and (2) retain
the right to act recklessly and to pursue investments that would be
considered irrational except when viewed from the point of view of the
common stock alone. Failure to do so in certain settings would lead to
the application of this limited right of fiduciary protection.
Of course, perhaps there is no need for a fiduciary duty to the
preferred. This is because action by the board in acting recklessly to
pursue a negative valuation opportunity might be grounds for a
derivative action.
The suggestion in this Article-that there should be a limited
fiduciary protection for the preferred in the narrow settings where the
ability of the preferred to bargain for contractual protections is
nonexistent-proposes an approach that depends on judges making
case-by-case determinations as to whether fiduciary review is
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appropriate. Such case-by-case determinations may add to expense
since there could be uncertainty engendered by such judicial decisions,
and one might consider whether a legislative solution would be feasible
as a less costly alternative. However, the entire argument denying
protection for preferred is built on the assumption that the preferred
can and do arrange either for contractual protections or a variety of
other alternative private mechanisms for protection, such as staged
financing or board control. What this Article suggests is that context
matters, and there are categories of cases outside the VC or other
specialty contexts where the barriers to negotiating contractual
protections are much more substantial. That determination seems to be
one that inevitably demands the fine-grained expertise of courts in
assessing the bargaining power of the preferred to negotiate contractual
protections and would seem ill-suited to a legislative solution since it
would be difficult to identify the context that suggests when a departure
from fiduciary protection is warranted.
CONCLUSION
For decades, commentators have debated whether courts should
imply protection to the preferred that goes beyond their contractually
negotiated protections and beyond the scope of the fiduciary protections
owed to all stockholders. This Article argues that the traditional rule
limiting preferred to their contractual protections makes sense in
certain contexts such as venture capital. An implied protection would
not be value-maximizing or cost-minimizing. First, since venture
capitalists and certain other preferred stockholders can bargain for
contractual protection or arrange alternative private strategies, there is
reason to suppose that the lack of protections is an "omission." Second,
where an agent such as the board represents multiple constituencies,
the agent will take steps from time to time that will advantage one
claimant and disadvantage another. So long as the wealth-shifting is
anticipated and can be bargained against by the adversely affected
claimant, the law should not intervene. Doing so would upset the risk
allocation of the parties and would likely add to costs of the exchange.
However, in certain limited contexts the preferred do not have the
opportunity to negotiate any of the contract terms, either because it
occurs in the context of a gift of preferred stock or in the context of
public preferred stock bought subsequent to the initial issuance. These
contexts are ones in which we can no longer be certain that the
preferred can anticipate or negotiate for protections against wealthshifting to the common. Moreover, if the extra protection is limited to
constraining intentional destruction of the preferred or against reckless
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investment, then the benefits of encouraging investment by investors
would be chilled by a contrary result. Common stockholders should be
bound by such a default rule or opt out and thereby signal that the
board will retain the right to intentionally destroy the preferred's value
or pursue investments that would be considered irrational except when
considered solely from the perspective of the common stockholder.
Additionally, because the initial preferred stockholder could protect its
interests through staged financing or board control, it might not
discount the stock even if it lacked protection, since the other protective
devices made the lack of such protections inconsequential. But to
subsequent purchasers, the lack of such protections for them of the
preferred stock might call for a limited fiduciary duty. Finally, because
VCs routinely provide for additional terms in shareholder agreements
with founders that are almost never found in the charter documents,
those provisions will not be transferable. The initial holders of the
preferred stock (the VCs) have other protections that render fiduciary
duties superfluous so the initial holders will not pay for these added
fiduciary protections. But if the markets for preferred stock are not as
efficient as for common stock, or if there are chinks in the efficient
capital market hypothesis, then the disciplining effects of the market
are weaker. Thus, subsequent buyers of the preferred stock may not
price the stock accurately to reflect the lack of transferable protections,
providing a justification for a limited fiduciary duty in that context
since implying the term would add value.
These may be the cases where maximizing the value of the common
will not maximize the value of the firm.

